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Satelliittipaikannus ja siihen perustuvat sovellukset ovat kasvava liiketoiminnan alue ympäri 
maailmaa. Paikannuslaitteet ovat edullisia, mobiiliverkkojen peitto on kasvanut ja internetis-
tä on tullut osa jokapäiväistä elämäämme. Tämä kehitys on mahdollistanut myös satelliitti-
paikannuksen hyödyntämisen useissa sovelluksissa. 
 
Satelliittipaikannusta käytetään monissa liiketoimintakriittisissä sovelluksissa kuten kuljetus-
kaluston ja arvokuljetusten seurannassa. Sovellusten yhteydessä mainostetaan vain niitten 
tuomia hyötyjä, mutta mahdollisista riskeistä ei ole mainintaa. Laureassa tehtiin aloite Sate-
risk-projektille, joka tutkii satelliittipaikannuksen lainopillisuuteen, käytettävyyteen ja tek-
niikkaan liittyviä riskejä. Projekti sai rahoituksen TEKES:lta ja projekti alkoi elokuussa vuonna 
2008. Projektin päävastuu on Laurealla ja projektin yhteistyökumppaneina ovat myös Lapin 
Yliopisto ja toimijoita yksityiseltä sektorilta. 
 
Tämän tutkimuksen päätavoite oli kartoittaa satelliittipaikannukseen ja sitä hyödyntaviin 
sovelluksiin liittyviä teknisiä riskejä. Toissijainen avoite oli tuottaa kansainvälisesti tunnustet-
tua tutkimustyötä ja siihen liittyviä julkaisuja. Tämä raportti ei käsittele lainopillisuuteen tai 
käytettävyyteen liityviä riskejä. 
 
Tutkimuksen aikana käytettiin monimetelmällistä suunnittelututkimusta. Monimenetelmälli-
nen suunnittelututkimus esittää kuinka teorian kehittäminen, tutkimusmenetelmät, kokeelli-
suus ja järjestelmäkehitys muodostavat yhtenäisen tutkimusprosessin. Tutkimusta arvioitiin 
suunnittelututkimuksen seitsemän ohjesäännön perusteella. Tutkimusprosessin aikana käytet-
tiin useita tutkimusmenetelmiä kuten kvalitatiivista riskianalyysia, grounded teoriaa, simulaa-
tiota ja kenttätestausta.  
 
Tämä raportti esittää neljän kansainvälisen julkaisun tulokset vuosilta 2009 ja 2010. Ensim-
mäinen ja toinen julkaisu käsittelevät satelliittipaikannusjärjestelmiin liittyviä tietoturvaris-
kejä. Järjestelmä on monimutkainen ja on altis useille haavoittuvuuksille. Kolmas julkaisu 
esittelee satelliittipaikannusjärjestelmille räätälöidyn riskianalyysimenetelmän, järjestel-
mään liittyviä teknisiä riskejä ja tulokset kolmesta riskianalyysisimulaatiosta. Simulaatioiden 
perusteella todettiin, että riskiprofiilit ovat riippuvaisia käyttäjän vaatimuksista ja sovelluk-
sen ominaisuuksista. Neljäs ja viimeinen julkaisu keskittyy käytännön testaukseen oikealla 
satelliipaikannusjärjestelmällä ja siinä esitetään myös mittaustulokset tiedonsiirron luotetta-
vuudelle ja paikannustarkkuudelle. 
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Satellite-based tracking is a rapidly growing business area in many parts of the world. Track-
ing devices have become inexpensive, mobile network coverage has grown, and the internet 
has become a part of our everyday life. This evolution has enabled the proliferation of satel-
lite-based tracking applications. 
 
Satellite based tracking is used with many business critical applications like fleet manage-
ment or the tracking of cash in transit. Very often only the benefits of the satellite based 
tracking solutions are advertised while the risks and weak points are forgotten. A proposal 
was made for the Saterisk project to investigate legal, usability and technical risks in satellite 
based tracking. The project got funding from the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and 
Innovation (TEKES) and began in 2008. The Saterisk project is headed by the Laurea University 
of Applied Sciences and it is made in cooperation with the University of Lapland and partners 
in private sector. 
 
The primary objective of this research was to find the most significant technical risks for sat-
ellite based tracking systems and the emphasis was on ICT. The secondary objective was to 
generate internationally recognized R&D research work and publications. This report does not 
examine legal or usability issues for satellite based tracking systems. 
 
This research work followed the multimethodological approach for IS research. In the mul-
timethodological approach theory building, observation, experimentation and systems-
developing phases are integrated during the research process. The research work was evalu-
ated according to seven guidelines for IS design research. The framework also encourages the 
researcher to use several research and evaluation methodologies. During the research process 
several research and evaluation methodologies were used such as qualitative risk analysis, 
grounded theory, simulation and field testing. 
 
This research report contains four international publications that were published during the 
years 2009 and 2010. The first and second publications cover information security related 
issues for satellite based tracking systems. The system is complex and it is vulnerable to many 
threats. The third publication presented a technical risk analysis procedure, with a list of 
possible technical risks and the results of three simulated risk analysis cases. It was found 
that the risk profiles are very dependent on use cases. The last publication investigates how 
the satellite based tracking system performs in real life and presents measured metrics for 
reliability and accuracy. 
 
This report concludes the research work and presents a description of the satellite based 
tracking system, describes research methodologies and summarizes all publications. 
 
Keywords: field testing, information security, risk analysis, satellite based tracking
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1 Introduction 
 
Satellite-based tracking is a rapidly growing business area in many parts of the world. Track-
ing devices have become inexpensive, mobile network coverage has grown, and the internet 
has become part of our everyday life. This evolution has enabled the proliferation of satellite-
based tracking applications. 
 
Satellite based tracking is used with many business critical applications like fleet manage-
ment or the tracking of cash in transit. Very often only the benefits of the satellite based 
tracking solutions are advertised while the risks and weak points are forgotten. A proposal 
was made for the Saterisk project to investigate legal, usability and technical risks in satellite 
based tracking. The project got funding from the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and 
Innovation (TEKES) and began in 2008. The Saterisk project is headed by the Laurea University 
of Applied Sciences and it is made in cooperation with the University of Lapland and partners 
in private sector. 
 
The Saterisk project has already produced many international publications and theses. The 
first thesis was written by Jouni Viitanen who was one of the Saterisk project originators. His 
thesis defined the requirements of the Saterisk project and it offered guidelines for future 
research work (Viitanen 2009). Markus Happonen continued the research work and he pub-
lished his thesis in 2010. Happonen presented both intentional and unintentional interference 
scenarios in satellite based tracking. Happonen also handled the communication of the time 
critical data transfer between multinational organizations. (Happonen 2010.) The latest thesis 
work was published by Pertti Kokkonen. He considered the legality of tracking personal prop-
erty if it is given to somebody else. He investigated some technical issues too. (Kokkonen 
2010.) 
 
Every one of the publications investigated possible risks in the selected research domains. 
However, none have provided system-level analysis of technical risk scenarios or presented a 
detailed system-level description for satellite based tracking system. 
 
The primary objective of this research was to find the most significant technical risks for sat-
ellite based tracking systems and the emphasis was on ICT. Previous publications did not con-
tain general technical description of the satellite based tracking system and it was defined 
during research work too. This report does not handle legal or usability issues for satellite 
based tracking systems. Legal issues were investigated by the University of Lapland.
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The secondary objective was to generate internationally recognized R&D research work and 
publications. This objective meets the strategic goals of the Laurea University of Applied Sci-
ences. 
 
This research followed the multimethodological approach for IS research. In the multimeth-
odological approach theory building, observation, experimentation and systems developing 
phases are integrated during the research process (Nunamaker, Chen & Purdin 1991). The 
main objective of this research process was to analyze and evaluate a satellite based tracking 
system, not to develop the system itself. Nevertheless, analysis tools and a real testing envi-
ronment were developed and integrated in the observation and experimentation phases. The 
analysis tools combined many research methodologies such as qualitative risk analysis, 
grounded theory and simulation. Experiments were made with the real satellite based track-
ing system. 
 
This research was evaluated using the framework for IS design research. The framework gives 
seven guidelines for researchers how to construct, present and evaluate their research work. 
The framework also encourages the researcher to use several research and evaluation meth-
odologies. Readers can use the framework for understanding IS design research. (Hevner, 
March, Park & Ram 2004.) 
 
This research report contains four international publications that were published during the 
years 2009 and 2010. The first and second publications covers information security related 
issues for satellite based tracking systems. The system is complex and it is vulnerable to many 
threats. The third publication presented a technical risk analysis procedure, with a list of 
possible technical risks and the results of three simulated risk analysis cases. It was found 
that the risk profiles are very dependent on use cases. The last publication investigates how 
the satellite based tracking system performs in real life and presents measured metrics for 
reliability and accuracy. 
 
The next chapter gives basic information about the history of satellite based navigation, pre-
sents the principle of satellite based tracking system and introduces four applications for 
satellite based tracking. The third chapter presents the methodologies that were used during 
the research process. In the fourth chapter all publications are summarized and the fifth 
chapter concludes the research work. 
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2 Satellite based tracking 
 
2.1 History of satellite based navigation 
 
The history of modern satellite navigation started in December 1973 when the Department of 
Defense (DoD) approved the Global Position System/NAVSTAR project.  The target of the pro-
ject was to combine the best practices of existing navigation projects 621B, TRANSIT and 
TIMATION. The existing projects were headed by the US Air Force or the Navy and they were 
competing with each other. The new navigation system was decided to be only for military 
use. (Stanford University News Service 1995.) 
 
The first Global Position System (GPS) satellite was launched in February 1978 and the con-
stellation of the 24 satellites was achieved on 1988. In 1983 civilians were allowed to use 
GPS. The reason being that a Korean airplane had got lost over Soviet borders and been shot 
down. However, the accuracy of the civilian signal was limited by the selective availability 
(SA). GPS was allowed for global use free of charge in 1993 and SA was disabled on 2000. 
(kowoma.de 2009, History of NAVSTAR GPS.) 
 
2.2 Principle of satellite based navigation 
 
This chapter presents the basic principle of satellite based navigation. Information is based on 
GPS satellite navigation system but the principle is the same with other satellite based navi-
gation systems too. 
 
Satellite based navigation is based on signals that are delivered by the satellites. The satel-
lites orbit the earth at a height of 20200 km at a speed of 3.9 km per second. The orbit time 
is 12 hours. (kowoma.de 2009, GPS Satellite Orbits.) The satellites are powered by solar pan-
els and the signal transmission power is about 50 watts. The estimated life time of the satel-
lites is 4.5 – 7.5 years depending on the satellite model. (kowoma.de 2009, GPS Satellites.) 
Figure 1 presents satellites in their orbits. 
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Figure 1 GPS satellites in their orbits (kowoma.de 2009, GPS Satellite Orbits) 
 
The satellites deliver a signal that contains satellite identification, satellite position and the 
time when the signal was delivered. A GPS receiver compares the signal timestamp with the 
time when the signal was received and calculates the distance between receiver and satel-
lite. The distance calculation is based on time difference between the sending and receiving 
time. (kowoma.de 2009, Position Determination with GPS.) 
 
When the GPS receiver knows the distance to the three satellites the position information is 
calculated by triangulation. A two dimensional position fix (2D), that includes latitude and 
longitude, requires signals from three satellites. The 2Dfix does not include altitude informa-
tion. A three dimensional position fix (3D) with the altitude can be calculated when the signal 
from four satellites is available. (kowoma.de 2009, Position Determination with GPS.) The 
principle of calculation of the 2D position fix is presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Principle of calculation 2D position fix 
 
2.3 Technical system description for satellite based tracking 
 
A modern satellite-based tracking system combines navigation and telecommunications tech-
nologies. The system is complicated and it consists of many technical segments, including the 
control segment, space segment, tracking segment, communication segment, data processing 
segment, application interface for external applications and end-user segment. The basic 
principle is that a tracked device is positioned by Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), 
and positioning data is delivered for post-processing via mobile networks, the internet or a 
secure network. (Kämppi, Guinness and Urpila 2010.) The principle is illustrated in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Principle of a satellite based tracking system (Kämppi at al 2010) 
 
The sequence of the tracking: 
 
1. Signals are delivered by the satellites 
2. GPS receiver calculates the position 
3. Position data is sent for post processing 
4. Position data is processed and stored 
5. End user access to position data 
 
The following sections describe the segments of the system more deeply.  
 
 
2.3.1 Control segment 
 
The control segment contains the master control station and the ground stations that monitor 
satellites in the space segment. Monitoring is made 24 hours in day. Ground stations receive 
monitoring data from satellites and they forward data to the master control station. The mas-
ter control station analyses monitoring data and sends adjustment commands to the satellites 
via the ground stations. (kowoma.de, Control Segment.) 
 
2.3.2 Space segment 
 
The space segment contains systems to deliver signals for calculating position. 
 
GPS (Global Positioning System) is the most commonly used satellite positioning system at the 
moment. Even though the GPS system is developed and operated by the United States Air 
Force for the Department of Defence, it is available for civilian use all over the world as well. 
The system currently contains 31 active satellites and it covers almost the entire world. (In-
sideGNSS, About GPS.) Replacing old satellites has experienced some delays, but the new 
generation of satellites now being sent to into orbit will be carrying new technology to ensure 
reliability (U.S. Air Force 2010). The position determined by the GPS system is accurate to 
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about 10-20m, since the U.S. government stopped intentionally degrading the signal for civil-
ian use in 2000 (About.com 2000).  
 
GLONASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikowaya Sistema, Global Navigation Satellite 
System) was developed and is maintained by the Russian government. The system is similar to 
the GPS and it should be able to offer as good accuracy as the GPS system. Compatibility with 
other GNSS systems is possible and at the moment is being further developed. (InsideGNSS, 
About GLONASS.) The satellite constellation of the system has improved during the past few 
years  and contains 21-23 active satellites at the moment (Russian Federal Space Agency, 
Information-Analytical Centre 2011). 
 
Galileo is under development by the European Commission (EC) and the European Space 
Agency (ESA) (ESA 2010, Whos´s involved in Galileo). The overall objective of the Galileo 
program, however, is to develop an independent navigation service for civilian use with bet-
ter performance than the current GPS service. Galileo is technically similar to GPS and GLON-
ASS. (ESA 2010, Why Europe needs Galileo.) The full constellation will contain 30 satellites in 
the future (ESA 2010, What is Galileo).  
 
Compass is under development by the China Satellite Navigation Project Center (CSNPC). 
China is planning to have a 12 satellite constellation, providing regional coverage and to the 
in operation in 2012. The full 35 satellites constellation is aimed to be complete in 2020 as 
the funding is already assured. (InsideGNSS, What is COMPASS.) The first satellite was 
launched in January 2010 and after the launch of the fifth satellite on August 1st 2010, the 
project is on course to complete its targets (National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
2010). 
 
2.3.3 Tracking segment 
 
The tracking segment contains devices that are able to calculate and deliver position infor-
mation for post processing. Today many mobile phones include GPS receivers, and it is easy to 
turn a mobile phone into a tracking device (Aspicore). For professional services and public 
authorities, TETRA clients and tracking-only clients (without communications functionality) 
are available (Motorola; Velocitybox). New positioning devices will support three systems 
(GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo) so that several techniques can be used simultaneously to guar-
antee better positioning accuracy and availability (GPSworld). 
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2.3.4 Communication segment 
 
The communication segment contains systems to deliver positioning data for post-processing 
and use by end-users. 
 
General Packet Radio System (GPRS) is an extension of the Global System for Mobile Com-
munications (GSM), and it offers mobile packet-switched access. The data rate offered is 40-
300 kbit/s, and the round trip time (RTT) is up to a few seconds. (3GPP, GPRS.) GSM offers 
connectivity in more than 218 countries and covers more than 80% of the world’s population 
(GSM World, GSM). 
 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is the successor to GSM. It offers 
voice, messaging and data services. (3GPP, UMTS.) The data rate is higher and the RTT is 
shorter compared to GSM. The data rate offered is up to 14 Mbit/s (3GPP, HSPA). Radio cov-
erage is continually expanding, and UMTS covers the most populated areas.  
  
Short Message Service (SMS) is the messaging service of GSM and UMTS. It allows users to 
send and receive text messages on a mobile phone. The length of messages is 160 characters, 
and messages can be sent globally via different operators. (3GPP 2009.) 
 
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is fourth-generation (4G) telecommunication standard. LTE offers 
a packet-optimized service without native support for voice communication. The data rate 
offered is up to 300 Mbit/s with low RTT. (3GPP, LTE.) The first commercial networks were 
launched in Scandinavia in late 2009 (phone.com 2009).  
 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) has been developed for professional services like police 
and fire departments (TETRA Mou Associaton, Markets & Applications). It offers voice, short 
data and packet data services. Strong security features and dedicated capacity are essential 
for professional use (TETRA Mou Associaton, Key Services). The latest release of TETRA offers 
data rates up to 500 kbit/s (TETRA Mou Associaton, Tetra Release 2). 
 
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is based on open 802.16 stan-
dards. WiMAX offers a packet-switched service, and voice communication is not supported. 
Data rates are up to 75 Mbit/s. (WiMax.com.) WiMAX is currently deployed in 149 countries, 
and 621 million people are covered (WIMAX Forum 2011). 
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2.3.5 Data processing segment 
 
The data processing segment contains systems to process and store position data for end-
users. These systems include servers and applications that make position data usable for end-
users. End-users can access their services via the Internet or a secured network. Systems have 
to be connected to the Internet safely and reliably. Secured networks are used for the profes-
sional services. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
 
2.3.6 Application programming interface for external applications 
 
API (Application Programming Interface) allows a software program to interact with other 
software and operating systems (PCMAG.COM). API makes it possible to combine the location 
data that we have acquired with other applications. Using API would also make it possible for 
us to do our own program that could use the data we have acquired and stored with the ap-
plications we have used. For example GpsGate service offers API so that users can send data 
to and receive data from the GpsGate-service to be processed with other applications. 
(GpsGate.com, Developer´s Guide GpsGate API.) 
  
2.3.7 End user segment 
 
The end-user segment offers customer interfaces for their positioning data. Typically the 
interface is offered via a network connection and web browser. Mobile terminals can be used 
as customer interfaces, too. (GpsGate, GpsGate Client.) 
 
2.4 Applications for satellite based tracking 
 
Satellite based tracking is used in many applications. The technological evolution of naviga-
tion and telecommunication equipment has enabled possibilities for many very interesting 
applications. From the researcher’s point of view, it is very important to know how satellite 
based tracking systems are used in real life. Sub segment sections present several applica-
tions and their special system requirements. 
 
2.4.1 Fleet management 
 
Fleet management is used to track cars, trucks, trailers and containers (SATCOM TECHNOL-
OGY, Fleet Management). The routes of trucks and trailers can be planned optimally to save 
fuel or vehicles can be directed to new routes in case of traffic accident. Fleet management 
can be integrated with geofencing and embedded car management functionality too. If the 
tracked vehicle, for e.g. a rent car, goes outside the allowed geographical area then an alarm 
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is triggered. With embedded functionality the ignition and brake system of a car can be man-
aged remotely. (SATCOM TECHNOLOGY, Anti Hijack.) 
 
Many commercial fleet management applications rely on commercial telecommunications 
networks. The quality of the networks can not be guaranteed and it is possible that the 
tracked vehicle will go outside the radio coverage or that the network is congested in highly 
populated areas. In an international environment roaming can cause problems. (Kämppi & 
Guinness, 2010.) 
 
2.4.2 Traffic signal management 
 
Traffic signal management is one of the most interesting applications for satellite based 
tracking. The Urban Traffic Control Centre of Helsinki has created a system called HeLMI that 
is able to create traffic signal priorities for busses and trams. Busses and trams are equipped 
with tracking devices that have integrated GPS and wireless modem functionality. The loca-
tion data is sent is in real time to the central computer that calculates traffic signal priorities 
for busses and trams. (Urban Traffic Control Centre of Helsinki, Renewal of HeLMI.) 
 
The system has a very strict requirement for data transfer reliability, deviation and delays. 
The data transfer delay and deviation has to be low because these metrics have a great effect 
on the system reliability. For example, if the signal from the bus is delayed on the data trans-
fer path then the traffic signal priority is created too late. (Urban Traffic Control Centre of 
Helsinki, New Public Transportation Sensor.) 
 
 
2.4.3 Cash in transit 
 
The tracking of cash in transit is used to track the transportation of valuable goods. The 
tracked vehicle sends location data in real time to the tracking center and the location of the 
vehicle is monitored all the time. If the vehicle disappears or the vehicle departs from the 
preplanned route then it is a possible indication of a robbery or other threat. (TRACK24, 
ROADRUNNER.) 
 
The cash in transit is one of the most demanding applications for satellite based tracking. It is 
possible that criminals will use jammers to interfere in real time tracking that they try to 
capture location data from telecommunications networks to find out used routes. The reli-
ability of the system has to be on the highest standard to avoid false alarms. 
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2.4.4 Road toll 
 
One of the latest applications for satellite based tracking is the road toll. The idea behind 
road toll is that tax is based on the type of vehicle, kilometers driven and routes. Cars are 
equipped with On Board Units (OBU). The OBU contains a GPS chip and a wireless modem and 
it is able to send taxing data in real time to the data center. If a car is outside of radio cover-
age the taxing data is buffered into the memory of the OBU. (The Slovak Spectator 2009). 
 
The OBU has to work in a very demanding environment inside a car. The inside temperature 
and humidity of a car can vary a lot depending on the time of year. In other words, the OBU is 
under hard environmental stress during the year. The number of cars creates hard require-
ments for the whole tolling system. The system has to be able to handle a  great number of 
tolling transactions with high reliability. Taxing data is not allowed to be lost in any circum-
stances. (Kämppi & Guinness 2010). 
 
It is possible that the tolling system will be a potential target for hackers whose objective is 
to cause harm to the system or manipulate taxing data. It would be a great disaster if hackers 
were able to destroy taxing data for one month. (Kämppi, Rajamäki & Guinness 2009). 
 
The latest possible threat to the road toll is the use of jammers. It is possible that some indi-
viduals are not willing to pay road toll and they would to use jammers to interfere with the 
OBU. (Kämppi & Guinness 2010). Jammers are very cheap and readily available via internet 
shops (JAMMER WORLD). 
 
3 Research process description 
 
3.1 Multimethodological approach 
 
The objective of this research was to define the most remarkable technical risks for satellite 
based tracking systems. In practice we had to evaluate and analyze the different functionality 
aspects of satellite based tracking systems. In other words, we had to take the role of system 
developer although our objective was not to make improvements to satellite based tracking 
systems. 
 
According to Nunamaker, Chen & Purdin “a research methodology consists of the combination 
of the process, methods, and tools that are used in conducting research in a research do-
main” (Nunamaker at al 1991.) In practice that means that a researcher has to be able to find 
suitable methods and tools for the research problem. It is quite obvious that broader research 
questions require the use of a wider range of methods and tools than narrower ones. Nuna-
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maker at al also states that researchers may ask the wrong research questions if they do not 
have complete understanding of a research domain. (Nunamaker at al 1991). 
 
Nunamaker at al present in their paper a multimethodological approach for IS research that 
integrates theory building, experimentation, observation and systems development phases 
together as in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Multimethodological approach to IS framework (Nunamaker at al 1991) 
 
Theory building provides basic knowledge for the research domain and it will raise new 
ideas, concepts, methods and models (Nunamaker at al 1991). This phase was included in 
every publication during the research process because every publication presented something 
new to the research domain. Before we started a new research phase (publication) we had to 
define the main objective for each publication. The theory building phase played a bigger 
role in the third publication [P3]. The third publication [P3] presented how qualitative risk 
analysis was integrated with grounded theory to find the most significant technical vulner-
abilities for satellite based tracking systems. Grounded theory was used to categorize known 
technical vulnerabilities, form system segments and investigate relationships between the 
segments of the system. Qualitative risk analysis was used to define risk profiles for three use 
cases. 
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Observation is needed when is relatively little known about a research area and there is a 
need to get a general view of the research domain. Typical research methods at this phase 
are case studies, field studies and sample surveys. This phase may also provide ideas and 
guidelines for the experimentation. (Nunamaker at al 1991.) The observation phase was used 
in [P1], [P2] and [P3]. Publications [P1] and [P2] investigated information security in satellite 
based tracking systems by integrating existing knowledge in the new research domain. Gener-
ated information was reusable in [P3] and [P4]. The third publication [P3] continued to gain 
knowledge of the research domain and it combined together with more detailed technical 
information of telecommunications and satellite based navigation. 
 
Experimentation is used when more practical knowledge is needed for the research domain. 
Laboratory and field experiments or computer and experimental simulations can be used. The 
results of experimentation may provide feedback to other research phases. (Nunamaker at al 
1991.) The third publication [P3] presented the prototype of a risk analysis tool that was used 
to define risk profiles for three simulated use cases. The generated knowledge of [P3] was 
reused in [P4]. The idea of the last publication [P4] was to get real hands on experience of 
satellite based tracking by using a real satellite based tracking system and to define metrics 
for the data transfer reliability and position accuracy. The last publication [P4] also gener-
ated complementary knowledge for the previous research phases. 
 
Systems development provides five stages for the research work: concept design, construct-
ing the architecture of the system, prototyping, product development and technology trans-
fer. This phase combines technological and theoretical knowledge into potential practical 
applications or prototypes. If the generated theories, concepts and systems are really useful 
they are transferred to organizations. (Nunamaker at al 1991.) As mentioned earlier the ob-
jective of this research was to analyze and evaluate satellite based tracking systems. Actual 
system development for satellite based tracking systems was not made during this research. 
Nevertheless, development work in other research phases was conducted. The prototype of a 
risk analysis tool that was used for simulation in the third publication [P3] required develop-
ment work. Also the field testing setup in the last publication [P4] required system integra-
tion and development actions. 
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Figure 5 summarizes the multimethodological approach for this research. 
 
 
Figure 5 Multimethodological approach for research work 
 
3.2 Research process evaluation 
 
Hevner, March, Park & Ram (2004) present a research framework for IS design research. The 
purpose of the framework is to give guidelines for researchers how to conduct, evaluate and 
present their work. It also helps readers and editors to understand IS design research. (Hevner 
at al 2004.) 
 
The design science is basically a problem solving paradigm. The target of IS design research is 
to solve identified problems and to create IT artifacts that meets the business needs. The IT 
artifact meets the target when it solves problems in an innovative way or improves current 
practices or solutions. (Hevner at al 2004.) 
 
The problem space and business needs are defined by the environment (people, organiza-
tions, technologies). IS research solves the problems and creates artifacts that meet the busi-
ness needs. IS research effectively uses the knowledge base that provides the foundational 
theories, frameworks, instruments, constructs, models, methods and instantiations used in IS 
research. When the problem is solved the artifact is added to the knowledge base. (Hevner at 
al 2004.) 
 
The form of the artifact is not defined very strictly. The most important thing is that the arti-
fact brings something new to the knowledge base. New IT artifacts can be defined as con-
structs (vocabulary and symbols), models (abstractions and representations), methods (algo-
rithms and practices) and instantiations (implemented and prototype systems). The cycle of IS 
design research framework is presented in figure 6 (Hevner at al 2004.) 
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Figure 6 Research framework for IS design (Hevner at al 2004)  
 
Hevner at al (2004) give seven guidelines for effective and rigorous design science research. 
The purpose of the guidelines is to assist researchers, reviewers, editors and readers to un-
derstand design science research. (Hevner at al 2004.) The following sections present the 
guidelines and explain how they were used during this research process. 
 
Guideline 1 Design as an Artifact 
The first guideline says that the artifact of design science research has to solve an identified 
problem. Research can generate several types of artifacts and the artifacts are rarely ready 
to be used in real life. The artifacts can be ideas, practices and technical capabilities. It is 
important that the information created by the artifact is reusable. (Hevner at al 2004.) 
 
The problem space for this research was defined by the Saterisk project. The Saterisk project 
defines that the objective of this research is to find possible technical risks for the satellite 
based tracking system. The Saterisk project did not define the form of artifacts and research-
ers had full freedom to solve problems independently. 
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Guideline 2 Problem Relevance 
The second guideline states that the objective of research is to create knowledge and under-
standing for future use. The research has to generate usable information for both IS research-
ers who plan, manage, and implement information systems and for IS researchers who plan, 
manage and implement technologies that are used in their development and implementation. 
(Hevner at al 2004.) 
 
This research process created four international publications in 2009 and 2010. The accep-
tance processes for the abstracts and the publications ensured that the content of the publi-
cations is scientifically relevant and reusable. The first publication [P1] is already used as a 
reference in one publication (Viitanen, Happonen, Patama & Rajamäki 2009) and one mas-
ter’s thesis (Kokkonen 2010) and that shows the reusability of created information. 
 
Guideline 3 Design Evaluation 
The third guideline says that the utility, quality and efficiency of a design artifact must be 
rigorously demonstrated via proper evaluation methods. IT artifacts can be evaluated in terms 
of functionality, completeness, performance, reliability and other relevant quality attributes. 
The evaluation phase also provides feedback to the construction phase. A design artifact is 
complete and effective when the problem is solved. Table 1 gives methodologies for design 
evaluation. (Hevner at al 2004.) 
 
This research process generated four publications and all of them have been evaluated by the 
acceptance processes of international conferences. Additionally, simulation was used in [P2] 
and field study in [P4]. The first publication [P1] was evaluated in a descriptive way. 
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Table 1  Methodologies for design evaluation (Hevner at al 2004) 
 
 
 
Guideline 4 Research Contributions 
The fourth guideline says that IS research must provide clear contributions in the research 
area. The IS design research can produce design artifacts, foundations or methodologies. The 
most important thing is that research process adds new information to the knowledge base. 
(Hevner at al 2004.) 
 
This research process produced both descriptive and functional artifacts. Descriptive artifacts 
provide basic information about satellite based tracking systems. Functional artifacts present 
tools and methodologies for finding technical vulnerabilities in satellite based tracking sys-
tems. All results are publicly available in the databases of conferences. 
 
Guideline 5 Research Rigor 
The fifth guideline states that the design science research has to use rigorous methods in both 
the construction and evaluation of the designed artifact. Furthermore, overemphasis on rigor 
can lessen the relevance of IS design research because both the environment and the artifact 
itself can be informal. The rigor is achieved by the effective use of the knowledge base. How-
ever, the basic idea is to evaluate how well an artifact works, not prove why it works. (Hev-
ner at al 2004.) 
 
The main purpose of the knowledge base is that it is used as a toolbox and a researcher can 
use tools and information that solve the problem most efficient way. Many tools were used 
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during this research process. Especially the third publication [P3] combined many methodolo-
gies such as qualitative risk analysis, grounded theory and simulation. The first [P1] and sec-
ond publication [P2] effectively combined existing information from the knowledge base. The 
last publication [P4] reused the information that was created in earlier publications. 
 
Guideline 6 Design as a Search Process 
The sixth guideline explains that abstraction and representation of means, ends and laws are 
components of design science research. Means are the set of actions and resources available 
to construct a solution and ends represent targets and constraints on the solution. Laws are 
uncontrollable forces the environment. When the means, ends and laws are realistic the de-
sign artifact becomes more relevant and valuable. (Hevner at al 2004.) 
 
The target of this research was to find possible technical vulnerabilities for satellite based 
tracking systems and the problem space was wide as presented in chapter 2. The problem 
space did not contain strict limitations and we had to set limitations by ourselves, we decided 
to focus on telecommunications. The greatest limit on the research process was the time that 
was available for the research work. 
 
Guideline 7 Communication of Research 
The last guideline states that design-science research must be presented both to technology-
oriented as well as management-oriented audiences. A technology-oriented audience need 
details to use the artifact within their implementation. A management-oriented audience 
needs information to evaluate if the artifact is usable in their organization. (Hevner at al 
2004.) 
 
The results of all the publications, except the journal [P2], were presented in conferences for 
scientific and technical oriented audiences. Publication [P1] was presented for the Saterisk 
management group and publication [P2] for the audience of other university. Continuous 
communication with research colleagues, audiences and lecturers provided self steering and 
added rigor in the research process. 
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The research process is summarized with the time schedule in figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Research process with time schedule 
 
4 Summary of Publications 
 
4.1 Information security in satellite tracking systems 
 
Commercial satellite based tracking solutions highlight the benefits for business but very 
rarely mention how their systems are protected against information security threats. The first 
publication [P1] and the second publication [P2] presents possible information security 
threats in satellite based tracking system and gives some guidelines how to make system less 
vulnerable. 
 
Many commercial satellite based tracking systems are built on the top of commercial tele-
communications networks. Telecommunications networks, like GSM and UMTS, have very lim-
ited features for end to end packet data protection. The data transfer path is secured in the 
air interface but only partially in the core network. In the internet the data path is fully un-
protected. Additionally, a user does not know how a network operator has protected the net-
work against security threats. (Kämppi at al 2009.) The data path is presented in figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Routing of user data in mobile networks (Kämppi at al 2009) 
 
The position data is processed and stored in a data center. The data center can be compared 
to a small corporate data center from the security point of view. If the data center is con-
nected to the internet, it is vulnerable to many threats; denial of service (DOS) attacks, vi-
ruses, worms, pharming, cross scripting, and social engineering. (Kämppi at al 2009.) 
 
In some commercial satellite tracking solutions, the data center is hosted by the service pro-
vider, so a user can not be sure how the positioning data is hosted. There are many open 
questions like: where is the data center located what kind of protection mechanisms are 
used, what is the professional level of personnel, and whether there is any co-operation with 
government? Therefore, the user has to be aware of what service is chosen. (Kämppi at al 
2009.) 
 
Commercial satellite tracking service providers have made matters easy by reusing smart 
phones as tracking devices. The user needs only to download a tracking application to the 
smart phone to use the smart phone as a tracking device. (Aspicore.) Smart phones can be 
compared to computers and they can have security vulnerabilities depending on the operating 
system used. 
 
New operating systems for smart phones, like iOS by Apple and Android by Google, are fasci-
nating but they are vulnerable too. Many security threats for these operating systems have 
been reported. (Apple 2010; Broersma 2010.) As the number of smart phones grows they be-
come more interesting targets for the hackers too. Dedicated devices for satellite tracking 
are available, but their security vulnerabilities have not been investigated here. 
 
End-users can access their positioning data via the internet, and their computers are vulner-
able to all typical threats of the internet. How well their equipment is protected and main-
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tained is fully dependent on the user. This can be a security risk for satellite tracking sys-
tems, if a attacker gains access to a hosting server by using stolen user accounts. (Kämppi at 
al 2009.) 
 
The system can be protected by using existing technology and using known best practices. 
The data transfer path can be protected with secure tunneling or by encrypting data mes-
sages with a security algorithm. The data processing center needs professional personnel and 
good security equipment. Personal computers and smart phones can be protected with secu-
rity suites that are offered by many software houses. (Kämppi at al 2009.) 
 
As discussed in this paper, a satellite tracking system is quite a complicated system from the 
information security point of view. It contains parts of wireless and wired communication, 
and it is obvious that it contains information security risks if the system is not built properly. 
Securing the satellite tracking system the data path is especially important if the system is 
used to deliver sensitive positioning data. 
 
4.2 Technical risk analysis for satellite tracking systems 
 
In this publication [P3], we focused on creating a flexible model to determine the most se-
vere technical risks in satellite-based tracking systems. This publication [P3] also extended 
the risk analysis to cover whole satellite based tracking system. 
 
The purpose of risk analysis is not to eliminate all risks because this is rarely possible. Risk 
analysis is used to find out the most severe risks, and reduce these risks to an acceptable 
level (Peltier 2001, 23). Peltier divides risk analysis methodologies into two main streams; 
quantitative risk analysis and qualitative risk analysis (Peltier 2001, 19-20). 
 
The target of quantitative risk analysis is to define a monetary or other numerical value for 
potential losses and determine the probabilities that such losses will occur for a given set of 
operations. It is often based on historical data, and the probability of a threat occurring is 
calculated by complex procedures. (Peltier 2001, 19-20.) Nevertheless, Sainsbury and Basker-
ville state that quantitative risk analysis is appropriate for frequently-occurring phenomenon, 
but it is particularly challenging when used to detect threats that are known but have never 
occurred (Sainsbury & Baskerville 2007).  
 
The target of qualitative risk analysis is to define subjective definitions for potential losses 
and their associated likelihood of occurring. The severity and likelihood of potential losses 
can be described with terms like low, medium and high. Qualitative risk analysis can describe 
very rare threats or threats that have not been measured with quantitative risk analysis. 
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Peltier states that the qualitative risk analysis can provide useful results when the risk man-
agement team is competent and can assess the risks accurately. (Peltier 2001, 20). 
 
Qualitative risk analysis was the best option for our research because we did not have histori-
cal data and our target was to find the most severe vulnerabilities without any limitations. 
We used the following steps of the Peltier´s practical methodology for qualitative risk analy-
sis (Peltier 2001, 23-34). 
 
1. Develop a scope statement 
2. Form a competent team 
3. Identify assets 
4. Identify threats 
5. Prioritize threats 
6. Define impact priority 
7. Calculate the total threat impact 
 
Nonetheless, Peltier does not give any guidelines for categorizing threats and we combined 
the risk analysis process with Grounded Theory. Grounded Theory offers a methodology to 
categorize data and to investigate relations between categories (Charmaz  2006, 43-71). The 
method also encourages moving from the particular to the more general thinking (Bryant & 
Charmaz 2007, 14-17).  The risk analysis process with Grounded Theory is presented in figure 
9. 
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A SCOPE
STATEMENT
FORM
A COMPETENT
TEAM
IDENTIFY
ASSETS
PRIORITIZE
THREATS
PRIOROTIZE
IMPACTS
CALCULATE
TOTAL
THREAT
IMPACT
PROTECT
LOCATION
DATA
THREATS
BY SEGMENT
GROUNDED
THEORY
SUBJECTIVE
DEFINITION
1 … 5
SUBJECTIVE
DEFINITION
1 … 5
PRIORITIZE
THREATS
RISK
FACTOR
2 … 10
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
+ =
 
Figure 9 Qualitative risk analysis process 
 
In order to avoid the problem of limited existing data or the limited knowledge of the risk 
analysis team, it is necessary to investigate the requirements of the applications and busi-
nesses too (Peltier 2001, 3). An application can have technical requirements that have not 
been levied on prior uses of the system. If the system can not offer a service with certain 
requirements, then it is a threat to the application. The requirements of the business can 
create technical requirements, and the technical limitations of the system causes threats to 
      
             30
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
those requirements being met. Using this approach, we were able to generate a model for 
identifying threats, shown in figure 10. 
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Figure 10 Model for identifying risks in satellite based tracking systems (Kämppi & Guinness 
2010) 
 
By using the model above we were able to define the list of the technical risks for each sys-
tem segment. Threats are summarized by segment in table 2. 
 
Table 2 Technical vulnerabilities in satellite based tracking systems 
SYSTEM SEGMENT THREATS 
SATELLITE SEGMENT UNINTENDED INTERFERENCE, INTENTIONAL 
INTERFERENCE, ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS, 
MULTIPATH PROPAGATION, SELECTIVE AVAIL-
ABILITY, TOTAL SIGNAL LOSS 
TRACKING SEGMENT HW FAULT, SW FAULT, POWER FEED BREAK-
DOWN, CLOCK DRIFT, SIGNAL ATTENUATION, 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
COMMUNICATION SEGMENT CAPACITY, RADIO COVERAGE, ROAMING, LA-
TENCY, INFORMATION SECURITY 
DATA PROCESSING SEGMENT HW FAULT, SW FAULT, POWER FEED BREAK-
DOWN, CAPACITY, INFORMATION SECURITY, 
DATABASE CORRUPTION 
END USER SEGMENT INFORMATION SECURITY 
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4.2.1 Use cases 
 
When the technical threats were defined we implemented an Excel-based tool for risk analy-
sis. We also created three fictional use cases for the risk analysis tool simulation. The use 
cases were personal fitness and sporting activity, road toll Netherlands and the tracking of 
the cash in transit. Each use case had its own technical setup and different requirements for 
the tracking system. (Kämppi & Guinness 2010.) Subsequent sections present the risk profiles 
for the each use case. 
 
Use case 1 
Satellite tracking can be used to track personal fitness activities like jogging. Tracking client 
software can be installed into a smart phone and use a freeware tracking service that can be 
used via internet. (Kämppi & Guinness 2010.) Figure 11 presents the risk profile for personal 
fitness activity. 
 
 
Figure 11 Risk profile for personal fitness activity (Kämppi & Guinness 2010) 
 
After analyzing this use case, we evaluated the overall risk profile as medium. The most criti-
cal threats are found in the data processing and tracking segments (Kämppi & Guinness 2010). 
 
Use case 2 
The Netherlands has decided to deploy a road toll system that is based on driven kilometers 
(Mitchie 2008). The system will cover the whole of the Netherlands, and people are charged 
whenever they are driving a car. The location data is very crucial for the business, and loca-
tion data must not be lost in any circumstances. The tracking device is able to buffer data if a 
network connection is lost. It is possible that some people are using jammers to avoid road 
tolls. (Kämppi & Guinness 2010.) Figure 12 presents the risk profile for the road toll. 
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Figure 12 Risk profile for road toll (Kämppi & Guinness 2010) 
 
The overall risk profile for this use case was evaluated to be from medium to high. The use of 
intentional interference could be fatal for the system, and this particular risk is rated high on 
the scale. Problems with the tracking device could cause a loss of location data. The road tax 
is based on the data collected, and any problems in data processing could lead to unreliable 
billing. (Kämppi & Guinness 2010.) 
 
Use case 3 
Cash in transit can be tracked with a satellite-based tracking system. In a fictional case, cash 
in transit is tracked in the Helsinki capital area. Robbery is possible, and many criminals 
might be using jammers. Location data is very sensitive, and real-time tracking is mandatory. 
(Kämppi & Guinness 2010.) Figure 13 presents the risk profile for cash in transit. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Risk profile for cash in transit (Kämppi & Guinness 2010) 
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The overall risk profile of this use case was rated from medium to high. We can see that the 
tool can be used to highlight the high risk of intentional interference and security threats for 
sensitive location data. (Kämppi & Guinness 2010.) 
 
4.2.2 Lessons to be learned 
 
The simulation gave us quite interesting results. We noticed that our tool was able to create 
the unique risk profile for each use case. In other words, it is not possible to create a general 
risk profile to cover all cases and risk analysis has to be made case by case. The model used 
to develop the tool described in this paper is very flexible. It is easy to add new navigation or 
telecommunications techniques to cover future needs. 
 
Grounded theory is not widely used in information system research but there are a few cases 
where grounded theory has been combined with other research methods (Bryant & Charmaz 
2007, 339-355). This publication shows that Grounded Theory can be combined with other 
methodologies with great results. Grounded Theory helps the team to understand complex 
systems and helps the team to look at the risk profile from a new view.  
 
4.3 Field testing for satellite based tracking systems 
 
Publications [P1], [P2] and [P3] investigated satellite based tracking system vulnerabilities 
with theoretical and qualitative research methodology. The last publication [P4] presents 
practical and more quantitative methodologies in a real life context. The last publication [P4] 
also presented the latest version of the system level description that was presented in chap-
ter 2.  
 
The target of the last research was to find out how a satellite based tracking system performs 
in real life. Data transfer reliability and position fix accuracy was chosen as performance met-
rics.  The previous phases of the research gave us a good theoretical basis and we had good 
knowledge of how the system works. We also knew what theoretical vulnerabilities could be 
faced during the test session.  
 
We decided to use a smart phone as a tracking device. The smart phone was equipped with 
commercial tracking application that had a very extensive feature set for logging and calcula-
tion of the position fix. We also found a tracking service that was free of charge and available 
via the internet. The tracking service offered very good possibilities for location data backup 
and downloads too. We used a Finnish telecom operator as a service provider. We supposed 
that a smart phone is not an optimal tracking device and we used a real GPS receiver with 
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data logging capability as a reference device in parallel with the smart phone. The combina-
tion of equipment and services offered us quite a comprehensive set of technology for field 
testing. The setup is described in figure 14. 
 
1
1
5
 
Figure 14 Field testing setup for a satellite based tracking system (Kämppi, Guinness & Urpila 
2010) 
 
We created five different types of test cases and our target was to emulate real use cases. 
The test cases were stationary tracking by car, rural and long haul tracking by car, urban 
tracking by car, open water tracking with a boat and bicycling. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
 
The location data was logged in the NMEA format. NMEA data format gives the coordinates of 
latitude and longitude, the number of detected satellites, the value of Horizontal Dilution of 
Precision (HDOP), the value of speed and much more. By comparing logged location data from 
both the tracking device and the tracking service we were able to calculate metrics for the 
data transfer reliability. The stationary accuracy was calculated by comparing logged location 
data to the coordinates of the known geographical position. We were also able to evaluate 
the precision of position fix by calculating the average for HDOP. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
 
The stationary test was executed with the smart phone and the GPS receiver. The setup pro-
vided us a possibility to compare results between two equipments. The results of testing re-
vealed that the smart phone is not a perfect tracking device. The used smart phone has slide-
out keyboard and GPS sensitivity is remarkable higher when the keyboard is exposed. The 
reason is that the GPS chip is located under the keyboard. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
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The smart phone was able to detect 2 to 10 ten satellites when the GPS receiver detected 7 
to 13 satellites in the same environment. The measured mean stationary longitude deviation 
of the smart phone in high sensitivity mode was 2.03 m and the mean stationary latitude de-
viation was 1.02 m. This observation does not directly reflect the accuracy expected because 
the measured sensitivity metrics (HDOP) were worse with the smart phone compared to the 
GPS receiver. (Kämppi at al 2010.) The reason could be software or hardware error in GPS 
receiver. Figure 15 shows the accuracy difference between the smart phone sensitivity modes 
and the GPS receiver. 
 
Mobile low sensitivity = keyboard closed 
Mobile high sensitivity = keyboard exposed 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Accuracy difference between smart phone and GPS receiver (Kämppi at al 2010) 
 
We found that data transfer reliability is 99.9 percent when the tracking device supports buff-
ering in case that there are connectivity problems. The result is very good when we take into 
account the variety of the test cases. However, the test set was executed only in Finland and 
more testing is needed in an international environment. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
 
The overall functionality of the tracking system was very good but we found a few weak 
points too. Smart phone battery consumption is high when the GPS is activated and the bat-
tery will drain very fast if a continuous power feed is not available. This could be a limitation 
in some use cases. A smart phone is not suitable for the serious fitness usage either. The 
smart phone does not stand moisture or hard mechanical stress. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
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We also found that an incoming circuit switched call can cause interruption for the active 
GPRS session and GPRS connection is suspended during a circuit switched call. This feature 
can cause interruption to the real time location tracking. If a tracking device supports buffer-
ing the tracking data is delivered to the tracking service when the GPRS connection is re-
leased from the suspension. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
 
One information security related vulnerability was found too. We noticed that it is possible to 
cause a service interruption to a single smart phone user by sending data to the user without 
user request. The network was not protected properly and our data load was routed to the 
mobile. The capacity was reserved from the radio interface and the internet connection of 
the mobile became unusable. A DOS attack could cause interruption to the real time tracking 
or the battery of the mobile phone will drain very fast. (Kämppi at al 2010.) 
 
As a summary, we found that basic functionality is very reliable and the system level per-
formance is quite good. In particular the modern telecommunication network can offer a 
reliable data transfer path for a satellite based tracking application. However, a smart phone 
can offer a satisfactory consumer level user experience with satellite based tracking service 
but in professional use it is more reasonable to consider other options. Dedicated tracking 
devices can offer more mechanical durability and they are not vulnerable to security risks as 
smart phones. 
 
4.4 Contribution of the author 
 
The first publication [P1] was written fully by the author but it was presented by Dr. Jyri Ra-
jamäki at the conference. The idea for the publication was also originated by Dr. Rajamäki. 
The publication [P1] was reviewed by Dr. Rajamäki and Robert Guinness. 
 
The second publication [P2] was written for a journal and was based on the first publication 
[P1]. The author conducted some additional research and Dr. Jyri Rajamäki edited the final 
version. 
 
The third publication [P3] was written and presented by the author. Dr. Jyri Rajamäki, Robert 
Guinness and Tatu Urpila reviewed the publication. Guinness also made some editing work. 
 
The last publication [P4] was produced through team work. The research and writing were 
done by the author and Robert Guinness. Tatu Urpila reviewed the paper and updated the 
references. The publication was presented by the author at the conference. 
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5 Conclusions and Discussions 
 
5.1 Main results 
 
The target of this research was to find the most critical technical risks of a satellite based 
tracking system. The research work was conducted as incremental research process and each 
publication presented new results for the final report. The form of results varies from theo-
retical descriptions to practical solutions. 
 
The basis of system level analysis is to know how the system works and what technologies are 
involved. At the beginning of the research process we constructed the first version of a sys-
tem description. We found that the system is complex and it combines many telecommunica-
tion, IT and navigation technologies. The system description is an essential part of each pub-
lication and it was improved during the research process. The last version of the system de-
scription presents seven system segments that have a specific role in the tracking chain. 
 
The first [P1] and the second publication [P2] investigated information security related vul-
nerabilities in satellite based tracking systems. Commercial satellite based tracking services 
are usually built using commercial telecommunication networks, internet and IT services. The 
level of information security is not usually known and a user has to be aware if a tracking 
service is used for tracking sensitive or confidential targets. Location data can be captured by 
the third party if the data transfer path is insecure or the location data is stored in insecure 
place. The system is a potential target for denial of service (DOS)-attacks, viruses, worms, 
pharming, cross scripting, and social engineering too. A modern smart phone has integrated 
GPS functionality and the user should be aware if the smart phone is used as tracking device.  
New smart phone operating systems, like iOS by Apple and Android by Google, have security 
vulnerabilities and they will be interesting targets for criminals as the number of terminals 
grows. 
 
The third publication [P3] presented a risk analysis procedure that was based on qualitative 
risk analysis and Grounded Theory. In qualitative risk analysis risk factors are based on the 
subjective definitions of risk analysis team. We found that the results are more reliable if the 
requirements of applications and business are taken into account too. Applications and busi-
ness can have requirements that have not existed before and the risk analysis team is not 
familiar with them. We also created a risk analysis tool to simulate the analysis of three fic-
tional risk analysis cases; personal fitness, road toll and cash on transit. The risk analysis tool 
was able to evaluate the risk factor for each technical threat on a scale from 2 (low) to 10 
(high). The simulation rated the risk factor of the top five threats for personal fitness as 6, 
for road toll as 8 and for cash on transit as 9. Results show that each application and service 
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has requirements of their own and we can not create a general risk profile for all satellite 
based tracking applications. As a summary, reliable risk analysis requires cooperation with the 
risk analysis team, application developers and business people.  
 
The last publication [P4] presented a real testing environment for satellite based tracking 
system. The environment was built using a smart phone, GPS receiver, commercial telecom-
munication networks and commercial tracking service. The target was to collect performance 
metrics and user experiences by executing test cases. The test cases were stationary tracking 
by car, rural and long haul tracking by car, urban tracking by car, open water tracking with a 
boat and bicycling. We found that that basic functionality is very reliable and the system 
level performance is good. Calculated data transfer reliability was 99.9% when the tracking 
device supported buffering. The measured mean stationary longitude deviation of the smart 
phone was 2.03 m and mean stationary latitude deviation was 1.02 m. 
 
We also noticed that the mechanical design of a smart phone can have affect to GPS perform-
ance. The used smart phone has a slide-out keyboard and GPS sensitivity is significantly 
higher when the keyboard is exposed. The reason is that the GPS chip is located under the 
keyboard. The smart phone was able to detect 2 to 10 ten satellites when the GPS receiver 
detected 7 to 13 satellites in the same environment. Our testing revealed two vulnerabilities 
for real time tracking too. Real time data transfer can be interrupted by incoming circuit 
switched call or by sending dummy data the mobile from the internet host. These vulnerabili-
ties were not found by theoretical risk analysis. 
 
5.2 Discussion of the results 
 
The first publication [P1] was written at the end of 2009 and then we raised the issue of 
smart phone information security. At that time Symbian was the dominant smart phone oper-
ating system and the other ones such as, iOS and Android, were challengers. Nobody knew the 
vulnerabilities of the new operating systems. After one year iOS and Android have extended 
their market share and the market share of Symbian has declined. Lately 65 security vulner-
abilities have been reported for iOS and 88 security vulnerabilities for Android 2.2 (Apple 
2010; Kingsley-Hughes 2010). The rising trend of discovered security vulnerabilities confirms 
our observation that was made in [P1]; users have to be careful with their smart phones if 
they are used with business critical applications. 
 
The third publication [P3] analyzed the technical risks of satellite based tracking systems. We 
observed that the requirements of applications and business have a strong relation to the risk 
profile. The observation is in line with the guidelines of IS design research. IS design research 
states that people, organizations and technology create business needs (Hevner at al 2004). In 
other words, when the system is designed according to needs then most of the technical risks 
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could be avoided too. [P3] also presented intentional and unintentional interference as a 
technical threat to the satellite segment. The threat is real and it has lately raised a few 
interesting issues about possible interference scenarios. Dr. Parkinson presented at IAC 2010 
conference that all existing navigation systems (GPS, GLONASS) and the new ones (Galileo, 
COMPASS) are using same L1 frequency. The use of the same frequency could cause interfer-
ence problems if the systems are not designed properly. (Parkinson 2010.) Another recently 
reported case covered the telecommunication system and GNSS interworking. Physorg.com 
reported on Feb 2010 that the 4G (LTE) network by Lightsquared will cause interference to 
the GPS signal in US because they are using almost same frequency. The results of the simula-
tion showed that the interference will start at 22.1 km for the aviation receiver and total 
signal loss occurred at 9.0 km from the transmitter. (Edwards 2011). 
 
The last publication [P4] considered a field testing scenario for satellite based tracking and 
gave us real hands on experience of system performance. We found that the system performs 
very reliably in different use cases. In particular data transfer reliability in commercial tele-
communication network was almost 100%. The testing period also revealed vulnerabilities 
that were not found through theoretical risk analysis. That observation shows that the testing 
period is an essential part of the system evaluation process and cannot be bypassed in any 
circumstances. Especially previously presented interference scenarios will require a proper 
field testing period. 
 
5.3 Discussion of the research process 
 
The objective of this research was to find the most critical technical risks for satellite based 
tracking systems. The emphasis was on system analyzing and evaluation, not on system devel-
opment. Furthermore, testing and analyzing tools were developed during the research process 
as well. 
 
A multimethodological approach for IS research recognizes four different phases for research; 
theory building, observation, experimentation and systems development (Nunamaker at al 
1991). All these phases are used in research process. Each publication started with a theory 
building phase. In the theory building phase we developed new ideas and set our objectives. 
In the observation phase we integrated new knowledge with the research domain and that 
was made mainly in publications [P1], [P2] and [P3]. Publications [P1] and [P2] integrated 
information security related issues with satellite based tracking systems. The third publica-
tion [P3] integrated the deeper knowledge of telecommunications and satellite based naviga-
tion with the research domain. For example the system description was developed in the ob-
servation phase. The last publication [P4] presented results that were found with real satel-
lite based tracking system in the experimentation phase. The last publication [P4] also reused 
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effectively the results of previous publications in experimentation phase. As mentioned ear-
lier, we did not make system development for satellite based tracking system but we devel-
oped analysis tools in the system development phase. As a summary, the emphasis of the 
research process moved from theory towards practical experiments. 
 
The research process was evaluated according to the guidelines for IS research. Hevner at al 
state that the research has to solve a meaningful problem, provide clear contributions in the 
research area, use rigorous research methods and the results have to be communicated to the 
audience properly. (Hevner at al 2004). The problem space for this research was defined by 
the Saterisk project. In other words, there was a real need to do this study and previous stud-
ies covered the problem space from a different angle. The research provided both theoretical 
and practical contributions; a system description for satellite based tracking systems, the list 
of found technical vulnerabilities, the prototype of a risk analysis tool, and measured per-
formance metrics for a real satellite based tracking system. According to Hevner the re-
searcher has to use rigorous research methods (Hevner at al 2004). The third publication pre-
sented how grounded theory was integrated with qualitative risk analysis and the fourth pub-
lication [P4] presented performance metrics that were achieved by field testing. Additionally, 
the contributions of publications [P1], [P3] and [P4] were presented for scientific audiences 
at international seminars. 
 
5.4 Limitations 
 
The scope of the research was very wide and many issues were studied. The satellite based 
tracking system combines many technologies and we concentrated on telecommunications 
and IT technologies. This was a natural choice because the author has been working with 
telecommunication systems for over ten years. 
 
Our research covered satellite based navigation systems on a general level. We were able to 
recognize technical threats that are common to all satellite based navigation systems but we 
did not investigate if some of navigation system is more vulnerable compared to the other 
ones. Our system description improved during the research process and the system descrip-
tion did not the cover control segment and external applications in [P3]. The latest improve-
ments were added to the system description in the last publication [P4]. Nevertheless, this 
does not lessen the results of [P3] because all previous system segments still exist in the final 
system description in [P4]. Anyway, our model for technical risk analysis is very flexible and 
recognized limitations could be added into the model easily. 
 
The test cases of field testing were executed only in Finland and mainly in a rural environ-
ment. The quality of the telecommunication networks may vary in different countries and the 
results of data transfer quality metrics are not directly comparable to the international envi-
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ronment. The focus of GPS performance testing was on stationary testing in an open environ-
ment. The next phase for GPS performance could be more specific testing in an urban envi-
ronment. 
 
5.5 Topics for future research 
 
The research area was very interesting and new ideas and research questions came out all the 
time. That phenomenon shows that there is still some work to do in research area. 
 
The risk analysis procedure was used with simulated cases during this research. The same 
procedure could be used with real applications and use cases to gain knowledge about real 
use cases. 
 
This research covered information security related issues and data transfer quality metrics for 
legacy telecommunications networks (GPRS, 3G). The Finnish Police uses TETRA telecommu-
nication systems in their daily routines but the technical vulnerabilities or performance as not 
yet been investigated by Laurea UAS. The field testing procedure could be useful for measur-
ing quality metrics for TETRA networks too. 
 
As discussed previously, it is possible that new satellite navigation systems (Galileo, COM-
PASS) could cause interference in existing systems (GPS, Glonass) if interworking is not de-
signed properly. This indicates that the features of new satellite navigation have to be stud-
ied properly and more research is needed. 
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? 
Abstract—Satellite tracking is one of the most rapidly growing 
business areas in the world, and there are already many commercial 
applications available. Benefits for the customer are advertised, but 
there is no mention of information security. Modern satellite 
tracking systems contain communication on many levels, so they are 
vulnerable to many risks of information security. This paper covers 
the main satellite tracking system information security 
vulnerabilities and gives guidelines on how to make systems more 
secure. 
 
Keywords—Information security, Internet, Mobile network, 
Satellite tracking 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
atellite tracking is one of the most rapidly growing 
business areas in the world. Tracking devices have 
become quite cheap, and they are available to nearly 
everybody. Even smart phones can be used as tracking 
devices. 
During the last decade, mobile network coverage has also 
grown,  and internet  has  become as  part  of  our  everyday life.  
This evolution has enabled the innovation of new solutions, 
and one of them is the satellite tracking system. 
Risks of satellite tracking have not been investigated 
widely, so a few students of Laurea University of Applied 
Sciences started to make preliminary research in 2008. 
Research on the technical risks of satellite tracking systems 
continued in 2009, and this paper describes one part of this 
larger research work. 
This research revealed that information security in satellite 
tracking systems is not guaranteed, and this paper describes 
major vulnerabilities and gives some guidelines on how 
information security can be improved. 
 
II. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEMS 
Modern satellite tracking systems consist of many technical 
segments: the satellite segment, communication segment, 
data processing segment, and end-user segment. The basic 
principle is that the tracked device is positioned by satellites, 
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and the positioning data is delivered for post-processing via 
mobile networks and the internet. This principle is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig 1 Principle of a satellite tracking system 
 
A. Satellite segment 
The satellite segment contains techniques to calculate the 
device’s position from satellite signals. 
 
1) GPS 
The most commonly used satellite positioning system is the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) [1]. It has been developed 
by the U.S. military, but service is also available for civilian 
usage. The system consists of 24-32 active satellites, and it 
covers whole world. Since the U.S. government stopped 
intentionally degrading the signal in 2000, the position data 
provided by GPS is quite accurate. 
 
2) GLONASS 
GLONASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikowaya 
Sistema, Global Navigation Satellite System) [1] is developed 
and used by Russia. The system is like GPS, and it should be 
able  to  offer  as  accurate  as  position  service  as  GPS.  In  
practice, the number of satellites operating in the GLONASS 
constellation has been quite low (8-12), so the service is as 
accurate as GPS. The satellite constellation is optimized so 
that usability is best behind Russian borders. 
 
3) GALILEO 
GALILEO [1] is under development by EGNOS (European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service). EGNOS is 
project that is sponsored by ESA (European Space Agency) 
and the European Commission. The goal of this project is to 
develop navigation service for civilian usage, independent of 
the military. GALILEO is technically like GPS and 
GLONASS, and some devices will be able to utilize all three 
Information security in satellite tracking systems 
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systems. In this way, several techniques can be used 
simultaneously to guarantee better positioning accuracy and 
reliability. 
 
B. Communication segment 
The communication segment contains techniques to deliver 
positioning data for post-processing and use by end-users. 
The most commonly used techniques are offered by mobile 
networks, namely the General Packet Radio System (GPRS) 
[2] and Short Message Service (SMS) [3]. The internet is 
used to route positioning data from mobile networks for post-
processing, and this makes the system globally available. 
End-users can access their data via the internet as well. 
 
C. Data processing segment 
The data processing segment contains systems to process 
and store position data for end-users. These systems include 
servers and applications that make position data. End-users 
can access their services via the internet, so systems have to 
be connected to internet safely and reliably. 
 
D. End-user segment 
The end-user segment offers customer interfaces for their 
positioning data. Typically interfaces are offered via internet 
connection and web browser. 
 
III. MOBILE NETWORK USER PLANE SECURITY 
A. History 
Originally GSM (Global System for Mobile 
communications) [4] did not offer as advanced data services 
as they currently do. In the first phase, there was Circuit 
Switched Data (CSD), followed by High Speed Circuit 
Switched Data (HSCSD) [5] that offered four times faster 
access rate compared to CSD. Common for these services is 
that they use communication channels based on Time-Slot 
Leasing (TSL) sheme. 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) was the first packet-
switched mobile network service that offered internet-like 
end-user experience. In its first phase, GPRS was quite slow 
and network delay was large. GPRS was followed by 
Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution (EDGE) [6], and 
it offered faster user data rate and smaller Round Trip Time 
(RTT). 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) [7] 
offers end-user data rates that make as real mobile internet 
experience as possible. Modern systems are upgraded with 
High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) [8], and this 
type of mobile internet connection is comparable to a fixed 
connection in terms of data rate. 
Common to all these development phases is a focus on 
developing faster networks, but mobile networks do not 
natively provide secure end-to-end user plane data transfer 
features.  
 
B. GPRS 
Originally GPRS was built on top of the GSM network 
infrastructure with a few additional network elements, and it 
reuses the majority of the existing network architecture. Later 
networks were upgraded with UMTS, and a few new network 
elements were introduced. Logical architecture of GPRS 
network is described in 3GPP TS 23.060 V9.2.0, as shown in 
Fig 2. 
On the Base Sub System (BSS) and UMTS Terrestrial 
Radio Access Network (UTRAN), user plane data can be 
encrypted between Mobile Station (MS) and Service GPRS 
Support Node (SGSN). BSS supports GPRS Encryption 
Algorithm (GEA) and UTRAN supports UMTS Encryption 
Algorithm (UEA). Equipment is now available that can break 
ciphering from the air interface, so it is possible to capture 
data before it enters BSS or UTRAN. 
 
 
 
Fig 2 GPRS Logical Architecture 
 
When data continues towards GPRS Gateway Support 
Node (GGSN), then data is encapsulated with GPRS 
Tunneling Protocol (GTP) [9] over IP. GTP does not support 
any encryption features. In practice, data is transferred as 
plain text, and it can be captured quite easily if the intruder 
has access to the backbone. GTP is used between operators as 
well, and it is quite vulnerable if traffic is routed via an 
insecure internet connection. From GGSN, data continues 
towards the internet, and then data is available to anybody. 
Data flow is presented in Fig 3. 
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C. Short Message Service 
Short message service (SMS) provides a method to send 
short messages via mobile networks [3]. Messages are 
delivered using signaling, and they are encrypted only in the 
air interface. After BSS and UTRAN they are transferred as 
plain text. From BSS and UTRAN the message continues 
towards the Mobile Switching Center (MSC) and Short 
Message Center (SMSC). 
Globally networks of different operators are connected with 
Signaling System Seven (SS7) [10], so short messages are 
delivered between operators using SS7 as well. SS7 does not 
support any security functions, so it is possible to capture 
messages from the operator network if somebody is able to 
break in. Nowadays SS7 can be carried over IP, and this 
makes SS7 even more vulnerable if signaling between 
operators is routed via an insecure internet path. On the 
internet, signaling data is available for anybody. 
In satellite tracking systems, positioning data is delivered 
for post-processing by a machine to machine (M2M) 
interface. Typically these interfaces (e.g. CIMD2) do not 
support any security functions, and data can be routed via an 
insecure internet path. 
 
D. Security solutions 
As discussed above, it is quite obvious that positioning data 
can not be carried safely via mobile networks. Globally there 
are many different operators with different information 
security practices, so the end-user can not rely on data being 
delivered safely. In the most blatant case, when data enters 
the internet, then it is available to anybody. 
 
1) Data protection with GPRS 
Data can be protected by establishing secure tunneling 
between the client and data processing center. By secure 
tunneling, we can make data transfer as secure as the chosen 
encryption method is. The most common technique is IP 
Secure Architecture (IPsec). 
 
2) Data protection with SMS 
Due to the fact that SMS is delivered in mobile network 
signaling, it can not be secured by tunneling like GPRS data. 
SMS is plain text, so it can encrypted before sending by using 
Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA), such as SHA-256, SHA-384, 
or SHA-512. 
 
IV. DATA CENTER SECURITY 
Position data is processed and stored in a place that can be 
compared to a small corporate data center from the security 
point of view. A data center is typically connected to the 
internet, so it is vulnerable for many threats like denial of 
service (DOS)-attacks, viruses, worms, pharming, cross 
scripting, and social engineering. 
In some commercial satellite tracking solutions, the data 
center is hosted by the service provider, so the user can not be 
sure how positioning data is hosted. There are many open 
questions like: Where is the data center located, what kind of 
protection mechanisms are used, what is the professional 
level of the personnel, and is there any co-operation with 
government? Therefore, the user has to be aware of what 
service is chosen. 
 
 
Fig 3 Data flow in GPRS 
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A. Security threats 
 
1) Denial of service -attacks 
The aim of denial of service attacks [11] is to make a 
website unavailable. A website can be overloaded by the 
attacker, and users will not be able to access their data. 
 
2) Viruses 
A computer virus is a small applet that needs a host 
program for spreading. Usually their purpose is to cause some 
harm to the infected system. 
 
3) Worms 
Worms are small applications that can spread 
independently in networks and execute code autonomously. 
Their goals are to cause disasters, open new security holes, 
and steal data. 
 
4) Pharming 
Pharming [12] is an attack in which a user is directed to a 
fake website instead of the real one. The user does not notice 
that they are at the fake website, so sensitive information like 
username and password can be stolen. Another term for this 
threat is “DNS cache poisoning”. 
 
5) Cross site scripting 
Cross site scripting (XSS) [13] is a WWW-server 
vulnerability where the attacker can execute code in the 
HTTP address or via an interactive webpage.  The purpose 
can be to steal data or usernames. 
 
6) Social engineering 
Social engineering is a method in which somebody is 
tricked into giving sensitive information to the attacker. This 
is a very common way to discover data about a company. 
 
B. Security solutions 
There are many security threats when services are available 
via the internet and only a few have been introduced here. 
The main way service providers can protect their users is to 
be aware of these threats and make the system as secure as 
possible. 
 
1) Best practices 
There are many guides that include instructions on how to 
create secure network, for example, RFC2196 Site Security 
Handbook [14] and Standard of Good Practice for 
Information Security [15]. 
 
2) Personnel 
Information security is an area where knowledge has to be 
updated frequently.  Personnel have to be aware about 
possible threats, which can be achieved by proper training. 
 
3) Security equipment 
Corporate networks can be secured with additional 
equipment like firewalls, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), 
and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). A well-planned 
security solution is built by using all of them as needed. 
 
4) Operating systems 
It is important to keep operating system software updated.  
There are frequent new software releases, and maintenance 
personnel have to be aware of these updates. Operating 
systems can be “hardened,” meaning that all unnecessary 
services all disabled. 
 
V. CLIENT SECURITY 
Commercial satellite tracking service providers have made 
matters easy by reusing smart phones as tracking devices. The 
user needs only to download a tracking application to turn his 
or her smart phone into a tracking device. Smart phones can 
be compared to computers in that they can have security 
vulnerabilities depending on the operating system used. 
Dedicated devices for satellite tracking are available, but 
their security vulnerabilities have not been investigated here. 
 
A. Symbian OS 
Symbian [16] is probably the most widely-used smart 
phone operating system in the world. Because it is like a 
computer, it has many vulnerable interfaces. 
Threats can occur via downloadable applications, GPRS, 
SMS, web browser, or email. In theory, it is possible that a 
mobile can be hijacked and managed remotely to direct 
positioning data to a place available to the attacker. 
 
B. iPhone 
The iPhone [17] is the newcomer in the mobile world, and 
there has already been a few severe security threats reported. 
It has been possible to capture iPhone data via SMS [18], and 
the first worms [19] have also been spread among iPhones. 
 
C. Other operating systems 
Recently new smart phone operating systems like Android 
[20] and Bada [21] have been released. Nobody knows yet 
how vulnerable they are going be. 
 
D. Security solutions 
Mobile devices can be protected by keeping the operating 
system up-to-date and by disabling interfaces that are not 
needed (e.g. Bluetooth). There are also a few commercial 
security applications available for extra protection. 
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VI. END-USER SECURITY 
End-users can access their positioning data via the internet, 
and their computers are vulnerable for all the typical threats 
of the internet. How well their equipment is protected and 
maintained is fully dependent on the user. This can be a 
security risk for satellite tracking systems, if the attacker 
gains access to a hosting server using stolen user accounts. 
 
A. Security threats 
1) Viruses, worms, adware, spyware 
The most common security threats for end-user are viruses, 
worms, adware, and spyware. These threats can open ports to 
the system, or they can steal user accounts directly. Usually 
the user does not notice anything before it is too late. 
 
2) Phishing 
Phishing [22] is a method in which attacker tries to request 
user accounts via email, phone, or faked web sites. 
 
B. Security solutions 
There are many commercial applications available for 
home users to protect their computer. Usually they are 
complete packages that include a firewall, virus scanner, and 
online protection against adware/spyware. 
Being aware is a good way to be secure. Suspicious web 
sites and unknown download sources have to be avoided and 
account information has to be kept in a secure place. 
RFC2504 [23] contains good instructions for end-users. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As discussed in this paper, the satellite tracking system is 
quite a complicated system from the information security 
point of view. It contains parts of wireless and wired 
communication, and it is obvious that it contains information 
security risks if the system is not built properly. 
In any case, most security risks can be mitigated, and there 
are already effective security solutions available that can be 
applied to satellite tracking systems. Securing the satellite 
tracking system data path is especially important if the system 
is used to deliver sensitive positioning data. 
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Abstract—Satellite tracking is one of the most rapidly growing 
service business areas in the world, and there are already many 
commercial applications available. Benefits of the service for the 
customer are advertised, but very seldom there is any mention of 
information security of the system. Modern satellite tracking systems 
contain communication and data processing on many levels, so they 
are vulnerable to many risks of information security. This paper 
covers the main satellite tracking system information security 
vulnerabilities and gives guidelines on how to make systems and 
services more secure. 
 
Keywords—Information security, Internet, Mobile network, 
Satellite tracking 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
atellite tracking is one of the most rapidly growing 
business areas in the world [1]. Tracking devices have 
become quite cheap, and they are available to nearly 
everybody. Even smart phones can be used as tracking 
devices. 
During the last decade, mobile network coverage has also 
grown, and internet has become a part of our everyday life. 
This evolution has enabled the innovation of new solutions, 
and one of them is the satellite tracking system. 
Risks of satellite tracking have not been investigated 
widely, so a few students of Laurea University of Applied 
Sciences started to make preliminary research in 2008, which 
then gave rise to the SATERISK (SATEllite tracking RISKs) 
research project [2]; this paper is a part of this large research 
project. 
Preliminary research revealed that information security in 
satellite tracking systems is not guaranteed, and this paper 
describes major vulnerabilities and gives some guidelines on 
how information security can be improved. Further research 
on the risks of satellite tracking is still needed; Chapter II 
presents the SATERISK research project; Chapter III 
describes the four segments (satellite, communications, data 
processing and end-user segment) of satellite tracking 
systems; the next four chapters, Chapters IV, V, VI and VII, 
discuss data security risks and solutions of these four 
 
Manuscript received January 29, 2010. This work was supported in by 
Laurea University of Applied Sciences, by Tekes – the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Technology and Innovation and by some private and 
governmental organizations. 
P. Kämppi is with Nokia Siemens Networks, Karaportti 3, Espoo, 02610 
Espoo, Finland (phone: 358-50-5140823; e-mail: pasi.p.kamppi@ laurea.fi). 
R. Guinness and J. Rajamäki are with the Laurea University of Applied 
Sciences, Vanha Maantie 9, Espoo, 02650 Finland.  
 
segments, and these are followed by conclusions in Chapter 
VII and by references. 
 
II. SATERISK PROJECT 
SATERISK is a Finnish research project, which aims at a 
situation where devices and services, operations procedures, as 
well as laws and legislations on positioning and tracking, will 
allow the use of so-called m2m (machine to machine) tracking 
devices across state and union borders. 
The project aims to bring new know-how on an 
international level to the European security field. The project 
will also create new methods and development paths for 
positioning and tracking systems. The widely-used US-based 
GPS (Global Positioning System) and Russian-based 
GLOSNASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikowaya 
Sistema, Global Navigation Satellite System) satellite 
positioning systems will soon get an EU counterpart and rival 
from Galileo [3]. While most of the satellites are still on the 
ground, it is important that any problems and possibilities 
related to the new system are charted. The SATERISK project 
also aims to offer technological solutions to issues that arise 
while the project is ongoing.  
SATERISK is a joint research project of universities, public 
organizations and private companies with regard to 
positioning, navigation and tracking systems on the whole 
tracking value chain, as shown in Fig. 1, founded by the 
participants and by Tekes – the Finnish Funding Agency for 
Technology and Innovation. The aim of the project is to 
evaluate the technical, operational and legislative needs and 
the associated risks for positioning and tracking, here and 
now, as well as in the future. Geographical examinations areas 
are (1) Finland, (2) EU / the Schengen Agreement Application 
Convention (SAAC) area and (4) Russia. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Sectors of SATERISK project 
Near-border and cross-border procedures for satellite 
tracking information, as well as the international co-
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operability are studied in [4] and [5]. An example of a 
technical risk, jamming, is studied in [6]. This paper is one 
part of the research on the technical risks of satellite tracking 
systems, mainly studied by Laurea University of Applied 
Sciences.  
 
III. SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEMS 
Modern satellite tracking systems consist of four main 
technical segments: the satellite and tracking segment, 
communication segment, data processing segment, and end-
user segment. The basic principle is that the tracked device is 
positioned by satellites, and the positioning data is delivered 
for post-processing via mobile networks and the internet. This 
principle is shown in Fig. 2. As an example, Fig. 3 describes 
the case of a remotely-tracked vehicle. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Principle of a satellite tracking system [7] 
Server
 
Fig. 3 Concept of remotely tracked vehicle 
 
A. Satellite and tracking segment 
The satellite and tracking segment contains satellites, radio 
path for satellite signals, signal receivers and techniques to 
calculate the device’s position from satellite signals. With 
regard to this study, the following satellite systems are 
relevant. 
 
1) GPS 
The most commonly used satellite positioning system is the 
Global Positioning System (GPS). It has been developed by 
the U.S. military, but service is also available for civilian 
usage. The system consists of 26-28 active satellites, and it 
covers the whole world. Since the U.S. government stopped 
intentionally degrading the signal in 2000, the position data 
provided by GPS is quite accurate in Finland. [8] 
 
2) GLONASS 
GLONASS is developed and used by Russia. The system is 
like GPS, and in principle it should be able to offer as accurate 
as position service as GPS. In practice, the number of satellites 
operating in the GLONASS constellation has been quite low 
(8-12), so the service is not as accurate as GPS worldwide. 
The satellite constellation is optimized so that usability is best 
within Russian borders. [8] 
 
3) GALILEO 
GALILEO is under development by EGNOS (European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service). EGNOS is a 
project that is sponsored by ESA (European Space Agency) 
and the European Commission. The goal of this project is to 
develop navigation services for civilian usage, independent of 
the military. GALILEO is technically like GPS and 
GLONASS, and some devices will be able to utilize all three 
systems. In this way, several techniques can be used 
simultaneously to guarantee better positioning accuracy and 
reliability. [8] 
 
B. Communication segment 
The communication segment contains techniques to deliver 
positioning data for post-processing and use by end-users. The 
most commonly used techniques are offered by mobile 
networks, namely the General Packet Radio System (GPRS) 
[9] and Short Message Service (SMS) [10]. The internet is 
used to route positioning data from mobile networks for post-
processing, and this makes the system globally available. End-
users can access their data via the internet as well. 
 
C. Data processing segment 
The data processing segment contains systems to process 
and store position data for end-users. These systems include 
servers and applications that make position data available. 
End-users can access their services via the internet, so systems 
have to be connected to the internet safely and reliably. 
 
D. End-user segment 
The end-user segment offers customer interfaces for their 
positioning data. Typically interfaces are offered via an 
internet connection and web browser. 
 
IV. SATELLITE AND TRACKING SEGMENT SECURITY 
Fig. 4 shows the satellite and tracking segment elements 
with the main technical challenges described in balloons. 
Commercial service providers and service users cannot 
contribute to the space constellation, data security of satellites 
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and the signals they are transmitting. Somehow, service 
providers and users could manage the radio path for satellite 
signals by operating procedures (e.g. avoid tunnels), by 
observations (e.g. checking possible jamming [6]) and by 
utilizing technical accessories (e.g. pseudolites [11], [12]). 
However, tracking devices are the main elements of satellite 
and tracking segment where service providers and user could 
contribute. Tracking devices might be dedicated devices or 
smart phones. The data security ability of dedicated tracking 
devices could vary significantly; some highly secure solutions 
are limited only to government agencies, e.g. [13]. On the 
other hand, data security of smart phones is highly dependent 
on the client software and the users’ actions.   
Satellite Positioning Elements
 Fig. 4 Satellite and tracking segment elements 
 
A. Client Security 
Some commercial satellite tracking service providers have 
made matters easy by reusing smart phones as tracking 
devices. The user needs only to download a tracking 
application to turn his or her smart phone into a tracking 
device. Smart phones can be compared to computers in that 
they can have security vulnerabilities depending on the 
operating system used. 
 
1) Symbian OS 
Symbian is probably the most widely-used smart phone 
operating system in the world. Because it is like a computer 
operating system, it has many vulnerable interfaces [14]. 
Threats can occur via downloadable applications, GPRS, 
SMS, web browser, or email. In theory, it is possible that a 
mobile phone can be hijacked and managed remotely to direct 
positioning data to a place available to the attacker. 
 
2) iPhone 
The iPhone is a newcomer in the mobile world [15], 
however, there has already been a few severe security threats 
reported. It has been possible to capture iPhone data via SMS 
[16], and the first worms [17] have also been spread among 
iPhones. 
 
3) Other operating systems 
Recently new smart phone operating systems like Android 
[18] and Bada [19] have been released. Nobody knows yet 
how vulnerable they are going be. 
 
B. Security solutions 
Mobile devices can be protected by keeping the operating 
system up-to-date and by disabling interfaces that are not 
needed (e.g. Bluetooth). There are also a few commercial 
security applications available for extra protection. 
 
V. COMMUNICATION SEGMENT SECURITY 
A. Overview of communication segment risks 
The communication segment could be divided physically 
into mobile and fixed networks. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the 
main technical challenges of these parts. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Mobile communication elements 
 
Server
 Fig. 6 Fixed network elements 
 
B. History of mobile networks 
Originally GSM (Global System for Mobile 
communications) [20] did not offer as advanced data services 
as they currently do. In the first phase, there was Circuit 
Switched Data (CSD), followed by High Speed Circuit 
Switched Data (HSCSD) [21] that offered four times faster 
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access rate compared to CSD. Common to these services is the 
use of communication channels based on a Time-Slot Leasing 
(TLS) sheme. 
The General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) was the first 
packet-switched mobile network service that offered an 
internet-like end-user experience. In its first phase, GPRS was 
quite slow and network delay was large. GPRS was followed 
by Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution (EDGE) [22], 
and it offered faster user data rate and smaller Round Trip 
Time (RTT). 
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS) [23] offers end-user data rates that make as real of a 
mobile internet experience as possible. Modern systems are 
upgraded with High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) 
[24], and this type of mobile internet connection is comparable 
to a fixed connection in terms of data rate. 
Common to all these development phases is a focus on 
developing faster networks, but mobile networks do not 
natively provide secure end-to-end user plane data transfer 
features.  
 
C. GPRS 
Originally GPRS was built on top of the GSM network 
infrastructure with a few additional network elements, and it 
reuses the majority of the existing network architecture. Later 
networks were upgraded with UMTS, and a few new network 
elements were introduced. 
Fig 7 [9] presents the logical architecture of the modern 
GPRS network. Each of the boxes describes a single network 
element or the functional entity. The interfaces between 
network elements and functional entities are drawn with lines 
and each of the interfaces carries signaling and/or user plane 
data. In the user plane the most vulnerable interfaces are Gn-, 
Gp- and Gi-interfaces. 
 
 
Fig. 7 GPRS Logical Architecture [9] 
 
On the Base Sub System (BSS) and UMTS Terrestrial 
Radio Access Network (UTRAN), user plane data can be 
encrypted between Mobile Station (MS) and Service GPRS 
Support Node (SGSN). BSS supports the GPRS Encryption 
Algorithm (GEA) and UTRAN supports the UMTS 
Encryption Algorithm (UEA). Equipment is now available 
that can break ciphering from the air interface, so it is possible 
to capture data before it enters BSS or UTRAN. 
When data continues towards a GPRS Gateway Support 
Node (GGSN), then data is encapsulated with GPRS 
Tunneling Protocol (GTP) [25] over IP. GTP does not support 
any encryption features. In practice, data is transferred as plain 
text, and it can be captured quite easily if the intruder has 
access to the backbone. GTP is used between operators as 
well, and it is quite vulnerable if traffic is routed via an 
insecure internet connection. From GGSN, data continues 
 
 
Fig. 8 Data flow in GPRS 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS Issue 1, Volume 3, 2009
12
  
towards the internet, and then data is available to anybody. 
Data flow is presented in Fig. 8. 
D. Short Message Service 
The Short Message Service (SMS) provides a method to 
send short messages via mobile networks [10]. Messages are 
delivered using signaling, and they are encrypted only in the 
air interface. After BSS and UTRAN they are transferred as 
plain text. From BSS and UTRAN the message continues 
towards the Mobile Switching Center (MSC) and Short 
Message Service Center (SMSC).  
Networks of different operators are connected globally with 
Signaling System Seven (SS7) [26], so short messages are 
delivered between operators using SS7 as well. SS7 does not 
support any security functions, so it is possible to capture 
messages from the operator network if somebody is able to 
break in. Nowadays SS7 can be carried over IP, and this 
makes SS7 even more vulnerable if signaling between 
operators is routed via an insecure internet path. On the 
internet, signaling data is available to anybody. 
In satellite tracking systems, positioning data is delivered 
for post-processing by a machine to machine (M2M) interface. 
Typically these interfaces (e.g. CIMD2) do not support any 
security functions, and data can be routed via an insecure 
internet path. Routing of SMS is presented in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig. 9 Routing of SMS 
 
Fig. 10 GPRS security solution 
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E. Security solutions 
As discussed above, it is quite obvious that positioning data 
can not be carried safely via mobile networks. Globally there 
are many different operators with different information 
security practices, so the end-user can not rely on data being 
delivered safely. In the most blatant case, when data enters the 
internet, then it is available to anybody. 
 
1) Data protection with GPRS 
Data can be protected by establishing secure tunneling 
between the client and data processing center. By secure 
tunneling, we can make data transfer as secure as the chosen 
encryption method. The most common technique is IP Secure 
Architecture (IPsec). GPRS security solution is presented in 
Fig. 10. 
 
2) Data protection with SMS 
Due to the fact that SMS is delivered in mobile network 
signaling, it can not be secured by tunneling like GPRS data. 
SMS is plain text, so it can encrypted before sending by using 
Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA), such as SHA-256, SHA-384, 
or SHA-512. SMS security solution is presented in Fig. 11. 
 
VI. DATA PROCESSING SEGMENT SECURITY 
Position data is processed and stored in a place that can be 
compared to a small corporate data center from the security 
point of view. A data center is typically connected to the 
internet, so it is vulnerable for many threats like denial of 
service (DOS)-attacks, viruses, worms, pharming, cross 
scripting, and social engineering. 
In some commercial satellite tracking solutions, the data 
center is hosted by the service provider, so the user can not be 
sure how positioning data is hosted. There are many open 
questions like: Where is the data center located, what kind of 
protection mechanisms are used, what is the professional level 
of the personnel, and is there any co-operation with 
government? Therefore, the user has to be aware of what 
service is chosen. 
 
A. Security threats 
 
1) Denial of service -attacks 
The aim of denial of service attacks [27] is to make a 
website unavailable. A website can be overloaded by the 
attacker, and users will not be able to access their data. 
 
2) Viruses 
A computer virus is a small applet that needs a host 
program for spreading. Usually their purpose is to cause some 
harm to the infected system. 
 
3) Worms 
Worms are small applications that can spread independently 
in networks and execute code autonomously. Their goals are 
to cause disasters, open new security holes, and steal data. 
 
4) Pharming 
Pharming [28] is an attack in which a user is directed to a 
fake website instead of the real one. The user does not notice 
that they are at the fake website, so sensitive information like 
username and password can be stolen. Another term for this 
threat is “DNS cache poisoning”. 
 
 
Fig. 11 SMS security solution 
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5) Cross site scripting 
Cross site scripting (XSS) [29] is a WWW-server 
vulnerability where the attacker can execute code in the HTTP 
address or via an interactive webpage.  The purpose can be to 
steal data or usernames. 
 
6) Social engineering 
Social engineering is a method in which somebody is 
tricked into giving sensitive information to the attacker. This 
is a very common way to discover data about a company. 
 
B. Security solutions 
There are many security threats when services are available 
via the internet and only a few have been introduced here. The 
main way service providers can protect their users is to be 
aware of these threats and make the system as secure as 
possible. 
 
1) Best practices 
There are many guides that include instructions on how to 
create secure networks, for example, RFC2196 Site Security 
Handbook [30] and Standard of Good Practice for 
Information Security [31]. 
 
2) Personnel 
Information security is an area where knowledge has to be 
updated frequently.  Personnel have to be aware about 
possible threats, which can be achieved by proper training. 
 
3) Security equipment 
Corporate networks can be secured with additional 
equipment like firewalls, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), 
and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). A well-planned 
security solution is built by using all of them as needed. 
 
4) Operating systems 
It is important to keep operating system software updated.  
There are frequent new software releases, and maintenance 
personnel have to be aware of these updates. Operating 
systems can be “hardened,” meaning that all unnecessary 
services are disabled. 
 
VII. END-USER SEGMENT SECURITY 
Fig. 12 shows the main technical challenges of data 
processing and end-user segments. End-users can access their 
positioning data via the internet, and their computers are 
vulnerable for all the typical threats of the internet. How well 
their equipment is protected and maintained is fully dependent 
on the user. This can be a security risk for satellite tracking 
systems, if the attacker gains access to a hosting server using 
stolen user accounts. 
 
Data processing and end-user 
segments
Server
 
Fig. 12 Data processing and end-user segment elements 
 
A. Security threats 
 
1) Viruses, worms, adware, spyware 
The most common security threats for end-user are viruses, 
worms, adware, and spyware. These threats can open ports to 
the system, or they can steal user accounts directly. Usually 
the user does not notice anything before it is too late. 
 
2) Phishing 
Phishing [32] is a method in which the attacker tries to 
request user accounts via email, phone, or faked web sites. 
 
B. Security solutions 
There are many commercial applications available for home 
users to protect their computer. Usually they are complete 
packages that include a firewall, virus scanner, and online 
protection against adware/spyware. 
Being aware is a good way to be secure. Suspicious web 
sites and unknown download sources have to be avoided and 
account information has to be kept in a secure place. RFC2504 
[33] contains good instructions for end-users. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As discussed in this paper, the satellite tracking system is 
quite a complicated system from the information security 
point of view. It contains parts of wireless and wired 
communication, and it is obvious that it contains information 
security risks if the system is not built properly. Many 
commercial satellite tracking applications are available, but 
normally no mention of their data security is given. 
In any case, most security risks can be mitigated, and there 
are already effective security solutions available that can be 
applied to satellite tracking systems. Service providers and 
users are more likely to security precautions seriously is they 
are aware of the wide range of vulnerabilities. Securing the 
satellite tracking system data path is especially important if the 
system is used to deliver sensitive positioning data. 
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Abstract 
Satellite tracking is one of the most rapidly 
growing business areas in the world [1], and there 
are already many commercial applications available 
like fleet management [2] or equipment theft alert 
[3]. Service providers advertise benefits for the 
customer, but they rarely mention the technical 
risks inherent in a tracking system. Modern satellite 
tracking systems require communication and 
functionality on many levels, so they are vulnerable 
to many technical risks. This paper describes 
system overview of satellite-based tracking, several 
risk analysis methods, covers the main technical 
risks of a satellite tracking system, and 
demonstrates usage of the developed risk analysis 
tool. 
Introduction 
Satellite tracking is one of the most rapidly 
growing business areas in the world [1]. Tracking 
devices have become relatively inexpensive [4], [5], 
and they are widely available on the commercial 
market. Even smart phones can be used as tracking 
devices. 
In addition, mobile network coverage has 
grown rapidly during the last decade, and mobile 
telecommunication has become a part of our 
everyday lives. This evolution has enabled the 
innovation of new services, such as satellite-based 
tracking applications. 
The technical risks of satellite tracking have 
not been thoroughly investigated, so there is a need 
to determine how to make satellite-based tracking 
applications operate. Many times service providers 
only advertise the benefits of their applications with 
no warnings about the risks inherent in these 
systems. 
Satellite tracking system contains functionality 
on many levels, and it is difficult to perform risk 
analysis that covers every technical threat that 
exists. The first part of this paper explains how the 
tracking system operates and covers the most 
vulnerable parts of the satellite tracking system. 
The second part reviews several methods of 
risk analysis, including qualitative risk analysis and 
grounded theory. The third part describes how we 
used grounded theory to identify risks of satellite-
based tracking. The fourth part elaborates these 
technical risks in more detail. In the fifth part, we 
describe the risk analysis tool that we developed 
during this research. The sixth part presents three 
risk analysis cases that were analyzed with this tool. 
The last part contains discussion of the results and 
conclusions.  
System Overview of Satellite-based 
Tracking 
Modern satellite-based tracking systems 
consists of many technical segments, including the 
satellite segment, user segment, communication 
segment, data processing segment and end-user 
segment. The basic principle is that a tracked device 
is positioned by Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS), and positioning data is delivered 
for post-processing via mobile networks, the 
internet or a secure network. The principle is 
portrayed in figure 1. 
  
Figure 1. Satellite tracking system
1. Satellite segment 
The satellite segment contains systems to 
deliver signals for calculating position. 
GPS (Global Positioning System) is the most 
commonly used satellite positioning system [6]. It 
has been developed by the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD), but service has been offered for 
civilian usage as well. The system contains 26-31 
active satellites [7], and it covers almost the entire 
world. The position determined by GPS is accurate 
to about 10-20m, since the government stopped 
intentionally degrading the signal for civilian usage 
in 2000. 
GLONASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya 
Sputnikowaya Sistema, Global Navigation Satellite 
System) [8] was developed and is maintained and 
used by the Russian government. The system is 
similar to GPS, and it should be able to offer a 
position service as accurate as GPS. The satellite 
constellation has improved during late years and the 
current system contains 21-23 active satellites [9]. 
Galileo [10] is under development by the 
European Tripartite Group (ETG), which is made 
up of the European Community (EC), Eurocontrol, 
and the European Space Agency (ESA). The first 
phase of Galileo is the European Geostationary 
Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) project, 
which will provide a Satellite-Based Augmentation 
System (SBAS) to improve the accuracy of GPS 
and GLONASS within Europe and its neighboring 
regions. The overall objective of the Galileo 
program, however, is to develop an independent 
navigation service for civilian usage with better 
performance than the current GPS service. Galileo 
is technically similar to GPS and GLONASS.  
COMPASS/Beidou [11] is under development 
by China Satellite Navigation Project Center 
(CSNPC). The target of the project is to have full 
satellite constellation (35 satellites) by year 2020. 
The first satellite was launched on 17th January 
2010. 
2. User segment 
The user segment contains devices that are 
able to calculate and deliver position information 
for post processing. Today many mobile phones 
include GPS receivers, and it is easy to turn a 
mobile phone into a tracking device [12]. For 
professional services and public authorities, 
TETRA clients [13] and tracking-only clients 
(without communications functionality) are 
available. New positioning devices will support 
three systems (GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo) so 
that several techniques can be used simultaneously 
to guarantee better positioning accuracy and 
availability. 
3. Communication segment 
The communication segment contains systems 
to deliver positioning data for post-processing and 
use by end-users.  
General Packet Radio System (GPRS) [14] is 
an extension of the Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM), and it offers mobile 
packet switched access. GSM offers connectivity in 
more than 218 countries and covers more than 80% 
of the world’s population [15]. The data rate offered 
is 40-300 kbit/s, and round trip time (RTT) is up to 
few seconds. Global network coverage is presented 
in figure 2 [16]. 
 
 
Figure 2. GSM and UMTS network coverage 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS) [17] is the successor to GSM. It 
offers voice, messaging and data services. The data 
rate is higher and RTT is shorter compared to GSM. 
The data rate offered is up to 14 Mbit/s [18]. Radio 
coverage is continually expanding, and UMTS 
covers the most populated areas.  
Short Message Service (SMS) [19] is the 
messaging service of GSM and UMTS. It allows 
users to send and receive text messages on a mobile 
phone. The length of the messages is 160 
characters, and messages can be sent globally via 
different operators. 
Long Term Evolution (LTE) [20] is fourth-
generation (4G) telecommunication standard. LTE 
offers a packet-optimized service without native 
support for voice communication. The data rate 
offered is up to 300 Mbit/s [20] with low RTT. The 
first commercial networks were launched in 
Scandinavia in late 2009. 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) [21] is 
developed for the professional services like police 
and fire departments. It offers voice, short data and 
packet data services. Strong security features and 
dedicated capacity are essential for professional 
use. The latest release of TETRA offers data rates 
up to 500 kbit/s [22]. 
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave 
Access (WiMAX) [23] is based on open 802.16 
standards. WiMAX offers a packet-switched 
service, and voice communication is not supported. 
Data rates are up to 75 Mbit/s. WiMAX is currently 
deployed in 147 countries, and 620 million people 
are covered [24]. 
4. Data processing segment 
The data processing segment contains systems 
to process and store position data for end-users. 
These systems include servers and applications that 
make position data usable for end-users. End-users 
can access their services via the Internet or a 
secured network. Systems have to be connected to 
the Internet safely and reliably. Secured networks 
are used for the professional services. 
5. End-user segment 
The end-user segment offers customer 
interfaces for their positioning data. Typically the 
interface is offered via a network connection and 
web browser. Mobile terminals can be used as 
customer interfaces, too.  
Use cases under study 
 Before performing any risk analysis, it is 
important to know how a system will be used. 
Particularly for complicated systems, such as 
satellite-based tracking, it is difficult if not 
impossible to understand the risks involved in the 
system in a generic way. By choosing a diverse set 
of use cases, however, one can consider a wide set 
of risks. As the number and diversity of the use 
cases under study grows, the risks inherent in the 
system can be known in a quasi-generic manner. 
In the current research, we chose five 
dissimilar use cases, based on current or proposed 
uses of satellite-based tracking. These use cases are 
described briefly below. 
Road toll 
EU directive 2004/52/EC [25] is the driving 
force for the EU wide road toll system in the 
Europe. The tax is based on driven kilometers, time 
of the day and used route. Netherlands is the first 
country that has decided to deploy location based 
road toll [26]. Road toll sets high requirements for 
the whole system. 
The number of the cars is high and number of 
the transaction is high too. The location data is not 
allowed to be lost because the tax is based on 
tracking. And the finally, tracking device has to 
work in the demanding environment of the car. 
Fleet management 
Satellite tracking can be used for fleet 
management to track cars, trucks, trailers and 
containers [2]. The fleet is possible to locate with 
tracking system and time schedules can be planned 
optimally. Stolen or missing fleet can be located 
more easily too. 
Fleet management requires wide network 
coverage and sets high standards for the tracking 
device. Trucks and containers are moving around 
the world and the tracking devices are installed in 
various environments. 
Traffic light management 
The traffic light management for public 
transportation is deployed in Helsinki, Finland [27]. 
When a bus is coming into traffic lights the green 
light is lit on as soon as possible. 
System requires low network latency and 
dedicated capacity because the traffic lights are 
managed in real time. 
Rescue department and security service 
Rescue department uses location information 
for managing troops via centralized system [28]. 
Head quarters have real time information about 
position of the troops and they can give new 
instructions based on location information. 
Operations are executed in very demanding 
environmental circumstances and that requires high 
quality tracking devices [29]. 
Cash In Transit 
The cash in transit is tracked in real time [30]. 
If the tracked target leaves the route or disappears 
from the map then there is probable security threat. 
Cash in transit tracking is one the most 
demanding tracking solutions. It requires high data 
privacy, ability for the real time tracking and 
possibility for intentional interference is existent. 
Risk analysis methods 
Introduction to risk analysis 
The purpose of risk analysis is not to eliminate 
all risks because this is rarely possible. Risk 
analysis is used to find out the most severe risks, 
and reduce these risks to an acceptable level. 
For example, in the business of securely 
transporting money, there may be many methods 
available for mitigating risks, but each has an 
associated cost. The company must determine if the 
risk mitigation is worth the cost. The company may 
be aware of many risks, but only the most harmful 
ones will be mitigated with cost-effective 
safeguards. 
In this research, we focused on creating a 
flexible model to determine the most severe risks 
satellite-based tracking systems. The model can be 
used to evaluate real business cases several 
examples of which will be described below. First, 
however, we will briefly review the major methods 
of risk analysis. 
Quantitative risk analysis 
The target of quantitative risk analysis is to 
define a monetary or other numerical value for 
potential losses [31] and determine the probabilities 
that such losses will occur for a given set of 
operations. It is often based on historical data, and 
the probability of a threat occurring is calculated by 
complex procedures. 
Quantitative risk analysis is appropriate for  
frequently-occurring phenomenon, but it is 
particularly challenging when used to detect threats 
that are known but have never occurred [32].  
Qualitative risk analysis 
The target of qualitative risk analysis is to 
define subjective definitions for potential losses and 
their associated likelihood of occurring [31]. Of the 
severity and likelihood of potential losses can be 
described with terms like low, medium and high. 
Qualitative risk analysis can describe very rare 
threats or threats that have not been measured with 
quantitative risk analysis. Qualitative risk analysis 
can provide useful results but only if the risk 
management team is competent and can assess the 
risks accurately. 
Process for qualitative risk analysis 
The target of this research was to find out the 
most severe risks and analyze them in a flexible 
way, so the qualitative risk analysis was selected. It 
is easy to learn, it is very flexible, and it does not 
require capital investments for specialized software. 
We chose to use Peltier’s Qualitative Risk 
Analysis (QRA) methodology [33]. The phases of 
the process are presented below. 
Develop a scope statement 
The risk analysis process starts with defining 
the scope. The scope of the risk analysis has to be 
clear, and the boundaries have to be set properly. If 
the scope is unclear, then it is possible that the 
results will be unreliable due to them being 
improperly used. 
Form a competent team 
In qualitative risk analysis, the risk factors are 
rated subjectively by a risk analysis team. It is very 
important that the members of the team are 
competent and qualified because the results are 
highly dependent on the competence of the team. 
Identify assets 
An asset is something that has value [34]. The 
asset can be tangible or intangible. Tangible assets 
include items that can be seen or touched. Common 
examples of tangible assets include a machine or 
furniture. Intangible assets include more abstract 
entities like data or information. 
Identify threats 
The risk analysis team defines the threats that 
are under review. If there is no existing list of 
threats, then the list can be made by brainstorming. 
Each member of the team writes down notes, and 
then notes are combined into a more complete list. 
If an existing list of threats is available, then the list 
can be reviewed and improved if needed. The 
drawback with this method is that it can limit 
thinking. The team members may look only at the 
existing list, and this may not foster new ideas. 
Finally, the list of threats should be properly 
categorized. 
Prioritize threats 
When the threats are defined, then the risk 
analysis process can continue by prioritizing risks. 
In practice, prioritizing means defining subjective 
value for the probability of the threat to occur. This 
probability is defined subjectively from low to high, 
and it is expressed as a numerical value, as defined 
in Table 1. If the evaluation is made independently 
by each team member, then the total threat priority 
is calculated as the average of the values assigned. 
When prioritizing the threats, it is important to keep 
a strong focus in the case that is under study. In 
other words, the team must estimate what the 
probability is of the threat in the case that is under 
study. 
Table 2 present total threat prioritizing. 
Table 1. Priority table 
Low Low to 
Medium 
Medium Medium 
To High 
High 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Table 2 present total threat prioritizing. 
Table 2. Total threat priority 
Threat Priority 
Threat 1 3 
Threat 2 2 
Threat 3 2 
Threat 4 3 
 
Impact priority 
In this phase, the team evaluates the impact of 
the loss occurring, again using the scale shown in 
Table 1. If the evaluation is made independently by 
each team member, then the final loss impact is 
calculated as the average. There has to be some 
discussion after the evaluations, and ideally each 
team member should be satisfied with the results. 
Threat impact evaluations are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.Total loss impact 
Threat Priority Loss 
impact 
Threat 1 3 5 
Threat 2 2 5 
Threat 3 2 3 
Threat 4 3 5 
 
Calculate total threat impact 
The total timpact of a threat can be defined as 
a risk factor, too. The risk factor is calculated as the 
sum of the threat priority and loss impact. The risk 
factor range is from 2 to 10. Calculation of the risk 
factor is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Risk factor calculation 
Threat Priority Loss 
impact 
Risk 
factor 
Threat 1 3 5 8 
Threat 2 2 5 7 
Threat 3 2 3 5 
Threat 4 3 5 8 
 
After risk factor calculation, the table is sorted 
by risk factors to find out the most severe threats. 
Grounded Theory as a tool for risk analysis 
The risk analysis method we used does not 
offer tools or guidelines for categorizing threats, so 
we used Grounded Theory. 
Grounded Theory offers methodology to 
categorize data and to investigate relations between 
categories. The method encourages moving from 
the particular to the more general thinking [35]. 
Grounded Theory is not widely used in 
information systems research but there are few 
cases where grounded theory has been combined 
with other research methods [36]. 
Next chapter describes how we used Grounded 
Theory with risk analysis. 
Identifying threats of satellite-based 
tracking 
In order to avoid the problem of limited 
existing data or limited knowledge of the risk 
analysis team, it is necessary to investigate the 
requirements of the applications and businesses, 
too. An application can have technical requirements 
that have not been levied on prior uses of the 
system. If the system can not offer service with 
certain requirements, then it is a threat for the 
application. The requirements of the business can 
create technical requirements, and the technical 
limitations of the system causes threats to those 
requirements being met. Using this approach, we 
were able to generate a model for identifying 
threats, shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Model for identifying technical threats 
We started identifying threats by listing well 
known technical threats. Our scope was limited to 
cover GPS, GPRS, 3G and SMS because the 
expertise of our risk analysis team was primarily in 
these areas. The asset we chose to investigate was 
location data. 
First, we defined the segments of the system 
and groups threats according to the segments in 
which they occur. 
We discovered that a single technical threat 
can be the cause for some higher-level threat. For 
example, the cause of a tracking failure can be a 
technical problem in tracking device. The technical 
problem is the lower-level threat, and the tracking 
failure is the higher-level threat. 
Also, we noticed that higher-level threats can 
help to find lower level threats. Data privacy threats 
are caused by certain technical reasons. The data 
privacy is higher level threat and the technical 
reason is the lower level threat. 
Next, we investigated if higher-level threat 
could occur in the other segments of the system. For 
example, privacy threats can be caused by many 
technical reasons in many segments. This cycle 
generated relations between all threats and 
segments. 
When we had sorted all well known threats we 
added requirements of the use cases described 
before. 
 The results of this methodology are described 
below with the threats grouped by system segment 
and category 
Detailed description of the threats 
This section gives a more detailed description 
of technical threats that were discovered. Threats 
are grouped by segment and logical category.  
Satellite segment 
Unintended interference 
Unintended interference can be caused by 
other radio transmitters that are working nearby the 
frequencies used by the positioning satellites 
(L1=1547,42 MHz , L2=1227,60 MHz) [6]. Weakly 
shielded or faulty electronics can cause 
interference, too. 
Intentional interference 
Intentional interference can be caused by 
sending interfering signals on the same frequency 
band that the satellite systems are using. Equipment 
that is used to generate interfering signals is called a 
jammer. GPS-jammers are quite easily available via 
the Internet, and they are inexpensive [37].  Prices 
for portable devices are starting from around $30, 
and the effective range is 2-300m.  
Atmospheric conditions 
The ionosphere and troposphere can cause 
variation of the speed of the GPS signal. Speed 
variation can cause 0-30m errors [38]. 
Multipath propagation 
Multipath propagation occurs when the signal 
is reflected from surrounding elements like 
buildings. Multipath propagation can cause 1 meter 
error [38]. 
Selective availability 
The Department of Defense can make 
intentional alteration of the time and epherimis 
signal, called Selective Availability (SA). SA can 
cause 0-70m errors [38]. SA was stopped on May 
2000. 
Total signal loss 
Total signal loss can occur when contact with 
the satellites is lost. These situations can occur in 
tunnels or parking garages. 
User Segment 
HW fault 
Hardware faults can occur due to 
environmental variables or other causes. Typical 
causes are mechanical stress, temperature change, 
high humidity, and aging.  
SW fault 
Software faults can occur in the operating 
system or in applications. SW errors can cause 
processing errors, data output errors or processing 
delays. 
Power feed breakdown 
The power feed for a tracking device can be 
external power source or internal batteries. Power 
feed breakdown can halt use of the tracking device 
completely.  
Clock drift 
The internal clock of the GPS receiver is not 
precise compared to atomic clocks onboard the 
satellites. Clock drift can cause 0-1.5m error [38]. 
Signal attenuation / Measurement noise 
Signal attenuation can occur if the tracking 
device is installed improperly or there are 
mechanical faults in antenna lines. Signal 
attenuation can cause 0-10m error [38]. 
Information security 
It is theoretically possible to hijack a smart 
phone and steal data. There has been vulnerabilities 
found for the iPhone [39] and Android [40]. This is 
a potential risk in the future. 
Communication segment 
Mobile phone intentional interference 
Intentional interference can be caused by 
sending interfering signals on the same frequency 
band than radio network is using. Equipment that is 
used to generate interfering signals is called a 
jammer. Mobile phone jammers are quite easily 
available via the internet, and they are inexpensive 
[41]. Multifunctional devices can generate 
interference for radio network frequencies and GPS. 
Prices for portable devices start at around $30, and 
the effective range is 2-20m.  
GPRS capacity 
GPRS user plane capacity could be a problem 
in highly populated areas. Rapidly growing use of 
mobile internet causes stress for mobile networks. 
Rural areas could have very limited GPRS capacity, 
or there may not be GPRS capacity at all. High 
amount of mobility requires network signaling 
capacity. 
GPRS latency 
Round-trip time (RTT) in GPRS can vary a lot, 
and it can be greater than 1000ms. 
GPRS information security 
GPRS offers data encryption only on the radio 
interface.  Data is delivered without encryption in 
the core network [42]. Data flow on the user plane 
is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Data flow in GPRS and UMTS 
GPRS radio coverage 
Although GSM offers connectivity in more 
than 218 countries and covers more that 80% of the 
world’s population, [15] there are still areas that are 
not covered by GSM [16], including parts of  
Canada, South America, Africa, Russia and 
Australia. Europe is well covered with GSM. 
GPRS roaming 
Roaming is the situation when a device is 
moving outside of its home network [43]. Roaming 
can cause a situation when the mobile device is not 
able to deliver location data via GPRS.  
3G packet data capacity 
3G offers higher data rates and more capacity 
than GSM, but use is increasing due to the real 
mobile Internet experience that it provides. 
Networks can run out of capacity in highly 
populated areas, and there has already been cases 
reported of capacity problems [44]. High amounts 
of mobility require high network signaling capacity. 
3G packet data latency 
3G offers much lower RTT compared to GSM. 
RTT is typically 200-300 ms. 
3G information security 
GPRS offers data encryption only on the radio 
interface.  Data is delivered without encryption in 
the core network [42]. Data flow on the user plane 
for 3G is also presented above in Figure 4. 
3G radio coverage 
3G has good radio coverage in North, West 
and South Europe. Other parts of the world are 
expanding their networks [16]. 
3G roaming 
Roaming is the situation when a device is 
moving outside of home network [43]. Roaming 
can cause situation when the mobile is not able to 
deliver location data via packet switched services.  
SMS capacity 
SMS is delivered in signaling. SMS delivery 
does not reserve radio network user plane capacity 
like GPRS or normal speech. Capacity is dependent 
on the operator. 
SMS latency 
Delivery time of the SMS can be even 10 
seconds [45], depending on operator and location. If 
SMS is not delivered at first try, then it is buffered 
by the network for resending. 
SMS information security 
Delivery of the SMS is encrypted only in the 
radio network. SMS is delivered without encryption 
in the core network and even between operators 
[42], Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Delivery of the SMS 
Internet capacity 
Capacity depends on used access network 
capacity, core network capacity and current 
network load.  
Internet latency 
Delivery time of the data depends on the 
capacity of the access network being used, as well 
as the current network load and distance between 
delivery points. 
Internet information security 
Data is not encrypted as default when 
delivered via Internet. Unsecured and sensitive data 
can be potential target for the hackers. 
Data processing segment 
HW fault 
Hardware faults can occur by environmental 
variables. Typical variables are mechanical stress, 
temperature changes, great humidity and aging.  
SW fault 
SW fault can occur in operating system or in 
application. SW error can cause processing errors, 
data output errors or processing delays. 
Power feed breakdown 
Power source failure can cause partial or total 
service outage. 
Processing capacity 
The large number of the transactions in some 
applications requires significant processing 
capacity. Lack of capacity can cause system 
malfunction. 
Information security 
Location data is delivered and accessed via 
external networks. The data center where the 
information is stored has to be protected properly 
against external security threats (virus, DOS-attack, 
etc). 
Database corruption 
Database corruption can cause loss of history 
data. Database corruption can be caused by e.g. 
hard disk failure or electricity break. 
End user segment 
Information security 
The location information can be accessed with 
a computer or mobile client, depending on the 
application. Possible vulnerabilities are weak 
password, weak virus protection and unshielded 
internet connection. 
Risk analysis tool 
When all technical threats were defined, we 
then decided to implement an Excel-based tool for 
risk analysis. Excel is easy to use, and it offers a 
flexible platform. 
We defined six questions for impact 
prioritizing: 
• How critical is it for the business that 
location data is determined and 
recorded at all times? 
• How critical is it for the business that 
real-time location data is known and 
delivered to the end-user, or is 
buffering allowed? 
• How critical is it for the business that 
the historcal position data is stored and 
maintained? 
• What are the needs for confidentiality 
of the data? 
• How important is network latency? 
• How important is location accuracy? 
Description of the risk analysis tool 
The risk analysis was recorded using Excel-
based spreadsheets. The spreadsheets include 
columns for country, index, segments, threats, 
probabilities, loss impact and total risk factors. 
Each threat was inserted in the chart and sorted by 
system segment. The threat probabilities were 
evaluated separately for each threat. A loss impact 
could have relations with many technical threats, 
and they were evaluated with questions that we 
defined earlier. The loss impact values were copied 
automatically into the same row from related 
threats. The risk factors were calculated 
automatically as the sum of the threat probabilities 
and loss impacts. The risk analysis tool is presented 
in Figure 6. 
 
  
Figure 6. Risk analysis tool 
Risk analysis cases 
Of the five use cases described above, we 
chose three for initial testing of our methodology 
and tool. The first two are existing uses of satellite-
based tracking, and thus, our results could 
conceivably be compared to real-world data, if 
available. The third is a fictional use case, but it 
could be tested via simulation. The use cases and 
result are presented below. 
Personal Fitness and Sporting Activities 
Satellite tracking can be used to track personal 
fitness activities like jogging. We installed tracking 
client software into a smart phone and created a 
user account on a free service that we found on the 
Internet. There is no relation of this use case to any 
business case, but it is an easily implemented 
example of using satellite-based tracking. Listed 
below are key characteristics of this use case, 
applicable to risk analysis:  
• Activity: Jogging 
• Geographic Area: Espoo, Finland 
• Service provider: gpsgate.com [46] 
• Smart phone: Nokia N95 
• Application: GSM Tracker [12] 
• Positioning System: GPS 
• Communication System: GPRS / 3G
  
Figure 7. Jogging risk profile 
 
After analyzing this use case, we evaluated the 
overall risk profile as medium. The most critical 
threats are found from the data processing and 
tracking segments. 
Road toll Netherlands 
As described above, Netherlands has decided 
to deploy road toll system that is based on driven 
kilometers [26]. The system will cover whole 
Netherlands, and people are charged whenever they 
are driving a car. The location data is very crucial 
for the business, and location data must not be lost 
in any circumstances. The tracking device is able to 
buffer data if network connection is lost. It is 
possible that some people are using jammers to 
avoid road tolls. 
Listed below are key characteristics of this use 
case:  
• Activity: Automobile driving 
• Geographic area: Netherlands (entire 
country) 
• Extent of coverage: 137000 km  of 
roadway 
• Number of tracking devices: 8 million 
cars 
• Tracking Device: On Board Unit 
(OBU) 
• Data Buffering: Supported by OBU 
Positioning System: currently GPS 
Galileo proposed for the future 
• Communication System: GPRS 
 
 
Figure 8. Road toll risk profile 
 The overall risk profile for this use case was 
evaluated to be from medium to high. The usage of 
intentional interference could be fatal for the 
system, and this particular risk is rated high on the 
scale. Problems with the tracking device could 
cause loss of location data. The road tax is based on 
the data collected, and any problems in data 
processing could lead to unreliable billing. 
Tracking of the Cash In Transit 
Cash in transit can be tracked with a satellite-
based tracking system. In a fictional case, cash in 
transit is tracked in the Helsinki capital area. 
Robbery is possible [47], and many criminals might 
be using jammers. Location data is very sensitive, 
and real-time tracking is mandatory. 
Below are listed available facts for risk 
analysis: 
• Activity: Cash In Transit 
• Geographic Area: Helsinki capital area 
• Tracking Device: Dedicated tracking 
device 
• Positioning System: GPS 
• Communication System: GPRS / 3G 
• Additional Threat: Usage of the 
jammers possible 
 
 
Figure 9. Cash in transit risk profile 
 
The overall risk profile of this use case was 
rated from medium to high. We can see that the tool 
can be used to highlight the high risk of intentional 
interference and security threats for sensitive 
location data. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
System-level risk analysis is a very 
complicated and demanding task, especially for 
complex systems. The risk analysis team has to 
know the basic functionality of the system, but this 
alone is not enough. We noticed that the risk 
analysis team has to be able to combine the 
requirements of the applications and business to the 
risk analysis process as well. Integrating the 
requirements of the applications and business with 
the risk analysis process helps to ensure that the 
scope is clear and the results are reliable. 
Our tool and use cases revealed that it is not 
possible to make general risk profiling at the system 
level because different solutions have different 
technical requirements. The same technical threats 
can have different risk factor in different cases. Too 
general of a risk analysis will give inaccurate 
results. 
The model used to develop the tool described 
in this paper is very flexible. It is easy to add new 
navigation or telecommunications techniques to 
cover future needs. Replacing our Excell-based tool 
with a database-based tool could be more useful in 
future larger-scale research. 
Grounded theory is not widely used in 
Information Security research. This research shows 
that Grounded Theory can be combined with other 
methodologies with great results. Grounded Theory 
helps the team to understand complex systems and 
helps the team to look at the risk profile from a new 
view. 
Laurea University of Applied Sciences will 
continue studying satellite-based tracking solutions. 
This research is a good starting point for other 
students or anybody else who is interested on 
satellite-based tracking systems. 
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Satellite-based tracking is a rapidly growing business area in many parts of the world. Tracking devices have 
become inexpensive, mobile network coverage has grown, and the internet has become part of our everyday life. 
This evolution has enabled the proliferation of satellite-based tracking applications. The basic principle behind 
satellite-based tracking is that a tracked device is positioned by GNSS satellites, and the positioning data is delivered 
for post-processing via mobile networks and the internet. This system is complex, and field testing provides an 
effective way to test system reliability and performance with real applications. In this research, analysis was 
performed on the reliability and accuracy of satellite-based tracking using commercially-available systems during 
various routes in several regions in Finland.  A smart phone was transformed into tracking device by installing a 
tracking application. Data created in the mobile device was sent over mobile networks to the third-party GPS 
tracking service. Later data from both the GPS tracking server and the mobile phone were downloaded and analyzed. 
Use cases included different activities like car driving, sailing and bicycling. We found that the system performs very 
well and basic functionality is very stable. Practical testing, however, did reveal that the smart phone is not able to 
perform as well as a dedicated GPS receiver. Also, we discovered that the position of the GPS module in the mobile 
device greatly affects the sensitivity, and in certain models, this sensitivity changes based on whether the keyboard is 
exposed because the GPS module is directly beneath the keyboard. Lastly, we found a few security vulnerabilities 
that have not been found in theoretical risk analysis. This study describes the main structure of the satellite-based 
tracking system, presents known technical risks, describes the test setup we used, and gives results on the 
performance of the satellite-based tracking system. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the number and commonness of satellite-based 
tracking applications increases, the need for a 
comprehensive study of the safety and reliability of 
these services becomes more important. By safety we 
refer primarily to the information security aspects of the 
location data pathway, although the accuracy and 
availability of the location data can also have safety 
implications, depending on the application under 
consideration. Reliability refers to primarily to the 
ability of the system to perform its intended functions 
whenever such functions are desired, within some 
measureable parameters. 
Considering the entire system of systems required to 
effectively provide satellite-based tracking services, the 
level of complexity is high, and the number of factors 
that can affect the services is large, making an end-to-
end reliability evaluation challenging. The purpose of 
the current study, which falls under the umbrella of the 
long-term Saterisk project, is to measure the 
performance of a commercially-available mobile device 
tracking service under several real-world case scenarios. 
 
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW OF SATELLITE 
BASED TRACKING 
Modern satellite-based tracking systems consists of 
many technical segments, including the control 
segment, space segment, user segment, communication 
segment, data processing segment, application interface 
for external applications and end-user segment. The 
basic principle is that a tracked device is positioned by 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), and 
positioning data is delivered for post-processing via 
mobile networks, the internet or a secure network. The 
principle is portrayed in figure 1. 
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Fig. 1: Principle of the satellite based tracking system 
 
II.I Control segment 
The control segment contains master control 
station and ground stations that monitor satellites in 
space segment. Monitoring is made 24 hours in day. 
Ground stations receive monitoring data from 
satellites and they forward data to the master control 
station. The master control station analyses 
monitoring data and sends adjustment commands to 
the satellites via ground stations. 
 
II.II Space segment 
The space segment contains systems to deliver 
signals for calculating position. 
GPS (Global Positioning System)1 is the most 
commonly used satellite positioning system at the 
moment. Even though the GPS system is being 
developed and operated by the United States Air 
Force for the Department of Defence, it is available 
for civilian use all over the world as well. The system 
currently contains 31 active satellites and it covers 
almost the entire world. Replacing old satellites has 
experienced some delays, but the new generation of 
satellites now being sent to the orbit will be carrying 
new technology to ensure reliability2. The position 
determined by the GPS system is accurate to about 
10-20m, since the U.S. government stopped 
intentionally degrading the signal for civilian use in 
2000. 
GLONASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya 
Sputnikowaya Sistema, Global Navigation Satellite 
System)3 was developed and is maintained by the 
Russian government. The satellite constellation of the 
system has improved during the past few years 
containing 21-23 active satellites at the moment4. The 
system is similar to the GPS and it should be able to 
offer as good accuracy as the GPS system. 
Compatibility with other GNSS systems is possible 
and at the moment further developed. 
Galileo5 is under development by the European 
Tripartite Group (ETG), which is made up of the 
European Community (EC), Eurocontrol, and the 
European Space Agency (ESA). The first phase of 
Galileo is the European Geostationary Navigation 
Overlay Service (EGNOS) project, which will 
provide a Satellite-Based Augmentation System 
(SBAS) to improve the accuracy of GPS and 
GLONASS within Europe and its neighbouring 
regions. The overall objective of the Galileo program, 
however, is to develop an independent navigation 
service for civilian usage with better performance 
than the current GPS service. Galileo is technically 
similar to GPS and GLONASS. The full constellation 
will contain 30 satellites in the future. 
Compass6 is under development by China 
Satellite Navigation Project Center (CSNPC). China 
is planning to have a 12 satellites constellation, 
providing regional coverage, in operation in 2012. 
The full 35 satellites constellation is aimed to be 
complete in 2020 as the funding is already assured. 
The first satellite was launched in January 2010 and 
after the launch of the fifth satellite on August 1st 
2010, the project is on course to completing its 
targets7. 
 
II.III User segment 
The user segment contains devices that are able to 
calculate and deliver position information for post 
processing. Today many mobile phones include GPS 
receivers, and it is easy to turn a mobile phone into a 
tracking device8. For professional services and public 
authorities, TETRA clients9 and tracking-only clients 
(without communications functionality) are available. 
New positioning devices will support three systems 
(GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo) so that several 
techniques can be used simultaneously to guarantee 
better positioning accuracy and availability. 
61st International Astronautical Congress, Prague, CZ. Copyright ©2010 by the International Astronautical Federation. All rights reserved. 
IAC-10-B2.1.12          Page 3 of 
15 
 
II.IV Communication segment 
The communication segment contains systems to 
deliver positioning data for post-processing and use 
by end-users.  
General Packet Radio System (GPRS)10 is an 
extension of the Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM), and it offers mobile packet 
switched access. GSM offers connectivity in more 
than 218 countries and covers more than 80% of the 
world’s population11. The data rate offered is 40-300 
kbit/s, and round trip time (RTT) is up to few 
seconds. Global network coverage is presented in 
figure 212. 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS)13 is the successor to GSM. It offers voice, 
messaging and data services. The data rate is higher 
and RTT is shorter compared to GSM. The data rate 
offered is up to 14 Mbit/s14. Radio coverage is 
continually expanding, and UMTS covers the most 
populated areas.  
Short Message Service (SMS)15 is the messaging 
service of GSM and UMTS. It allows users to send 
and receive text messages on a mobile phone. The 
length of the messages is 160 characters, and 
messages can be sent globally via different operators. 
Long Term Evolution (LTE)16 is fourth-
generation (4G) telecommunication standard. LTE 
offers a packet-optimized service without native 
support for voice communication. The data rate 
offered is up to 300 Mbit/s16 with low RTT. The first 
commercial networks were launched in Scandinavia 
in late 2009. 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA)17 is 
developed for the professional services like police 
and fire departments. It offers voice, short data and 
packet data services. Strong security features and 
dedicated capacity are essential for professional use. 
The latest release of TETRA offers data rates up to 
500 kbit/s18. 
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave 
Access (WiMAX)19 is based on open 802.16 
standards. WiMAX offers a packet-switched service, 
and voice communication is not supported. Data rates 
are up to 75 Mbit/s. WiMAX is currently deployed in 
147 countries, and 620 million people are covered20. 
 
II.V Data processing segment 
The data processing segment contains systems to 
process and store position data for end-users. These 
systems include servers and applications that make 
position data usable for end-users. End-users can 
access their services via the Internet or a secured 
network. Systems have to be connected to the Internet 
safely and reliably. Secured networks are used for the 
professional services. 
 
II.VI Application programming interface for external 
applications 
API (Application Programming Interface)21 
allows a software program to interact with other 
software and operating systems. API makes it 
possible to combine the location data that we have 
acquired with other applications. Using API would 
also make it possible for us to do our own program 
that could use the data we have acquired and stored 
with the applications we have used. For example 
GpsGate service, that we have used in our research, 
offers API so that users can send data to and receive 
data from the GpsGate-service to be processed with 
other applications22. 
 
II.VII End user segment 
The end-user segment offers customer interfaces 
for their positioning data. Typically the interface is 
offered via a network connection and web browser. 
Mobile terminals can be used as customer interfaces, 
too.  
 
III. KNOWN TECHNICAL RISKS 
Technical risk analysis23 was made earlier during 
Saterisk project. Results of technical risk analysis 
give guidelines for field testing too. 
 
III.I Control segment 
As the control segment is operated by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) for critical military 
operations, risks due to technical failures in the 
control segment are judged to be relatively minor 
compared to other risks. Potential problems include 
software or hardware updates to the control segment, 
which could have unintended consequences. 
The DoD ensures a high level of reliability by 
implementing a control segment design featuring a 
high level of redundancy. For example, every GPS 
satellite can be seen from at least two monitor stations 
at all times. Also, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 
operates a global network of GPS receivers that 
measure the reliability of the GPS civilian signals. If 
a problem occurs, an alarm can be triggered and sent 
to multiple operations centers within 4 seconds, in 
order to alert users that the integrity of the GPS signal 
may be compromised. 
Despite these measures, problems can and do 
occur. For example, in January 2010 the GPS Wing 
of the U.S. Air Force implemented a software grade 
which caused a small number of military GPS 
receivers to experience loss of GPS lock or the 
inability to acquire satellite signals altogether. This 
problem, however, was limited only to some military 
users using a specific subset of receivers. 
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This episode, however, highlights the potential for 
future upgrades to affect even civilian users. It is 
expected that this risk is mitigated by a 
comprehensive testing program before any 
widespread software upgrade is initiated. Such risks, 
however, cannot be reduced entirely to zero. 
 
III.II Space segment 
 
Unintended interference 
Unintended interference can be caused by other 
radio transmitters that are working nearby the 
frequencies used by the positioning satellites 
(L1=1547,42 MHz , L2=1227,60 MHz)24. Weakly 
shielded or faulty electronics can cause interference, 
too. 
 
Intentional interference 
Intentional interference can be caused by sending 
interfering signals on the same frequency band that 
the satellite systems are using. Equipment that is used 
to generate interfering signals is called a jammer. 
GPS-jammers are quite easily available via the 
Internet, and they are inexpensive24.  Prices for 
portable devices are starting from around $30, and the 
effective range is 2-300m. 
 
Atmospheric conditions 
The ionosphere and troposphere can cause 
variation of the speed of the GPS signal. Speed 
variation can cause 0-30m errors26. 
 
Multipath propagation 
Multipath propagation occurs when the signal is 
reflected from surrounding elements like buildings. 
Multipath propagation can cause 1 meter error26. 
 
Selective availability 
For the GPS system the U.S. Department of 
Defence can make intentional alteration of the time 
and epherimis signal, called Selective Availability 
(SA). SA can cause 0-70m errors26. SA for civilian 
service was stopped on May 2000, but it is still 
technically possible for U.S. to execute. 
 
Total signal loss 
Total signal loss can occur when contact with the 
satellites is lost. These situations can occur in tunnels 
or parking garages. 
 
III.III User segment 
The tracking device is complicated construction 
and it combines the functionalities of the GPS 
receiver and mobile phone. Many times, depending 
on application, it has to work in the demanding 
environment and it is vulnerable for many 
environmental threats. Following chapters describes 
the main threats. 
 
HW fault 
Hardware faults can occur due to environmental 
variables or other causes. Typical causes are 
mechanical stress, temperature change, high 
humidity, and aging.  
 
SW fault 
Software faults can occur in the operating system 
or in applications. SW errors can cause processing 
errors, data output errors or processing delays. 
 
Power feed breakdown 
The power feed for a tracking device can be 
external power source or internal batteries. Power 
feed breakdown can halt use of the tracking device 
completely.  
 
Clock drift 
The internal clock of the GPS receiver is not 
precise compared to atomic clocks onboard the 
satellites. Clock drift can cause 0-1.5m error26. 
 
Signal attenuation / Measurement noise 
Signal attenuation can occur if the tracking device 
is installed improperly or there are mechanical faults 
in antenna lines. Signal attenuation can cause 0-10m 
error25. 
 
Information security 
It is theoretically possible to hijack a smart phone 
and steal data. As more and more different smart 
phones come to the market including different 
software and applications, information security is in a 
key role in the future. These threats already exist. 
Vulnerabilities have already been found for the 
iPhone27 and Android28. This is a potential risk in the 
near future.  
 
III.IV Communication segment 
The usage of the internet has increased 
communication network load rapidly and application 
guaranteed service quality can be offered very rarely. 
The security issues are many times in secondary role 
or they are even ignored. It is important to know the 
technical risks of the communications networks 
because it speeds up problem solving and test case 
analyzing. Following chapters presents the basic 
technical risk of the communications networks. 
 
Mobile phone intentional interference 
Intentional interference can be caused by sending 
interfering signals on the same frequency band than 
radio network is using. Equipment that is used to 
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generate interfering signals is called a jammer. 
Mobile phone jammers are quite easily available via 
the internet, and they are inexpensive29. 
Multifunctional devices can generate interference for 
radio network frequencies and GPS. Prices for 
portable devices start at around $30, and the effective 
range is 2-20m. 
 
Mobility 
When the mobile phone is moving in the network 
it performs actions like cell hand overs, inter system 
handovers, location area updates and routing area 
updates. In some cases the mobility can cause 
additional delay or even data loss if the data 
connection is cut off during mobility action. 
Environmental variables can cause changes for the 
quality of the radio signal. 
 
GPRS/3G capacity 
GPRS user plane capacity could be a problem in 
highly populated areas. Rapidly growing use of 
mobile internet causes stress for mobile networks. 
Rural areas could have very limited GPRS capacity, 
or there may not be GPRS capacity at all. High 
amount of mobility requires network signalling 
capacity. There have already been cases reported of 
capacity problems32. 
 
GPRS/3G latency 
Round-trip time (RTT) in GPRS can vary a lot, 
and it can be greater than 1000ms. 3G offers much 
lower RTT compared to GSM. RTT is typically 200-
300 ms. 
 
GPRS/3G information security 
GPRS and 3G offers data encryption only on the 
radio interface.  Data is delivered without encryption 
in the core network30.  
 
GPRS/3G radio coverage 
Although GSM offers connectivity in more than 
218 countries and covers more that 80% of the 
world’s population11, there are still areas that are not 
covered by GSM12, including parts of  Canada, South 
America, Africa, Russia and Australia. Europe is well 
covered with GSM. 
3G has good radio coverage in North, West and 
South Europe. Other parts of the world are expanding 
their networks12. 
 
GPRS/3G roaming 
Roaming is the situation when a device is moving 
outside of home network31. Roaming can cause 
situation when the mobile is not able to deliver 
location data via packet switched services. 
 
Internet capacity 
Capacity depends on used access network 
capacity, core network capacity and current network 
load.  
 
Internet latency 
Delivery time of the data depends on the capacity 
of the access network being used, as well as the 
current network load and distance between delivery 
points. 
 
Internet information security 
Data is not encrypted as default when delivered 
via Internet. Unsecured and sensitive data can be 
potential target for the hackers. 
 
III.V Data processing segment 
The location data is stored and processed by 
servers that offers user interface too. For the end user 
is essential that service cluster offers secure and 
reliable service. Following chapters describes the 
main vulnerabilities of the service cluster. 
 
HW fault 
Hardware faults can occur by environmental 
variables. Typical variables are mechanical stress, 
temperature changes, great humidity and aging.  
 
SW fault 
SW fault can occur in operating system or in 
application. SW error can cause processing errors, 
data output errors or processing delays. 
 
Power feed breakdown 
Power source failure can cause partial or total 
service outage. 
 
Processing capacity 
The large number of the transactions in some 
applications requires significant processing capacity. 
Lack of capacity can cause system malfunction. 
 
Information security 
Location data is delivered and accessed via 
external networks. The data center where the 
information is stored has to be protected properly 
against external security threats (virus, DOS-attack, 
etc). 
 
Database corruption 
Database corruption can cause loss of history data. 
Database corruption can be caused by e.g. hard disk 
failure or electricity break. 
 
 
III.VI End user segment 
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The location information can be accessed with a 
computer or mobile client, depending on the 
application. Typically the user interface is offered via 
internet connection and web browser. Possible 
vulnerabilities are weak password, weak virus 
protection and unshielded internet connection. 
The latest versions of the smart phones like 
iPhone and Android based mobiles are more and 
more like computers than legacy mobiles. This 
evolution has caused that they have became 
vulnerable for the same threats than computers. 
 
IV. FIELD TEST SETUP DESCRIPTION 
For field testing we had to build up testing 
environment. We used a smart phone as a tracking 
device in parallel with real GPS receiver. We 
executed all the tests in Finland and we used Finnish 
mobile network service providers. 
Tracking data was logged both in the smart phone, 
in the GPS receiver and in the server. After test logs 
were downloaded for post processing. 
 Used field test setup is described in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Field test setup. 
 
IV.I Control segment and  Space segment 
We used smart phones in this test because most of 
the smart phones nowadays support GPS navigation 
and tracking.  GPS tracing equipment are commonly 
available and they are cheap. Other positioning and 
tracking systems than GPS were not available for this 
research. 
 
IV.II User segment 
 
Smart phone 
Nokia smart phone N9533 (V31.0.017) was used as 
tracking device. Nokia N95 is equipped with the TI 
GPS5300 GPS chip that supports Assisted GPS (A-
GPS)34. The smart phone was equipped with the GSM 
Tracker 3 (v3.22)35 application. GSM Tracker uses 
the GPS of the smart phone and forwards location 
data in NMEA36 format via wireless networks to the 
selected tracking service. Used smart phone is 
presented in Figure 3. 
 
    
 
Fig. 3: Nokia N95 smart phone 
 
The GSM Tracker offers many options to set 
location triggers and logging options. The user can 
define time and distance triggers for location 
triggering. GSM Tracker is able to save location data 
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to the file in NMEA format in parallel with mobile 
network information (cell id). Logs from the mobile 
were transferred for the post processing via USB 
connection. The screen shot of  GSM Tracker is 
presented in Figure 4. 
 
       
 
Fig. 4: GSM tracker screen shot 
 
GPS receiver 
GPS receiver PhotoNav37 was used in parallel 
with Nokia N95. Photonav is equipped with SiRF 
Star III GPS chip and WindowsCE 5.0 operating 
system. 
VisualGPSce38 was used for real time signal 
browsing and as logging application. Location data 
was stored in NMEA format. Photonav supports high 
capacity secure digital memory cards.  Photonav with 
VisualGPSce is presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Photonav GPS receiver with VisualGPSce 
 
IV.III Communication segment 
We used services of the Finnish mobile network 
operators (Elisa and Sonera). Elisa and Sonera offer 
modern mobile network services that support GPRS, 
EDGE, 3G and HSDPA data services. The largest 
cities are covered with 3G and more rural areas with 
2G. Both operators offer very good network coverage 
in Finland. 
 
IV.IV Data processing segment 
GPS Trace Orange39 offers web based free service 
for satellite based tracking. The service supports 
about 100 different tracking devices. The user can 
follow tracked device in real time or the racking data 
can be downloaded in four forms (OziExplorer, 
NMEA, Google Earth, Wialon). The location data is 
stored for 30 days and then it is deleted automatically. 
The tracking device is recognised by IMEI 
number and the location data is received in NMEA 
format. The screen shot of the GPS Trace Orange is 
presented in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: GPS Trace Orange screen shot 
 
IV.V End user segment 
PC and laptop was equipped with Windows XP 
operating system. Microsoft Internet Explorer or 
Mozilla Firefox was used as web browser. 
 
V. TEST CASES 
 
V.I Stationary tracking 
Accuracy tests were executed by stationary 
tracking. The smart phone and GPS receiver was 
located in the car during one hour. Tracking devices 
were covered with sun shields, Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Smart phone installed in the car 
 
The car was parked on the roof top of the parking 
garage or on the ground level parking place.  The 
reference location was estimated with the map service 
(Kansalaisen Karttapaikka)40. 
After testing logs were downloaded from the GPS 
devices for the post processing 
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V.II Rural and long haul tracking by car 
The purpose of the rural and long haul testing was 
to find out reliability of the location data transfer via 
mobile networks. Routes contained roads (max 100 
km/h) and high ways (max 120 km/h). Test duration 
was several hours per track and. length up to 350 km. 
  Testing route was covered with GPRS, EDGE 
and 3G mobile networks. Cell changes and inter 
system handovers were logged too. The smart phone 
was located on the top of the console.  GPS receiver 
was not used in test case. Figure 8 present how the 
smart phone was installed in the car. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Smart phone installed in the car 
 
V.III Urban tracking by car  
The main purpose of this test case was to find out 
how urban environment (buildings, urban canyons, 
tunnels) affects to GPS tracing accuracy. Test was 
executed with the car in the Helsinki capital area. 
Figure 9 presents how the GPS devices were installed 
in the car. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: Nokia N95 and Photonav GPS receiver 
installed in the car 
 
V.IV Open water tracking 
Tracking on the open water was executed with the 
boat on Saimaa lake district in Finland. The duration 
of the test was several hours. The speed of the boat 
was constant 18 km/h. The smart phone was installed 
like in figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10: Smart phone in the boat  
 
V.V Bicycling 
The smart phone was located on the top of the 
back bag or in the side pocket of the bicycling shorts 
during bicycling exercise, figure 11.  
 
 
 
Fig. 11: Smart phone with bicycling equipment 
 
Test duration was 30-120 min and the length of 
the trip up to 40 km per exercise.  The purpose of this 
test case was to find out how smart phone performs 
with fitness activity.  
 
VI. RESULTS 
 
Below we present the results from the results from 
our various measurements using the test set-up 
described above. This section is divided into 
subsections based on the type of measurement being 
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performed, including position precision and data loss 
rate. 
 
VI.II Position Precision of Fixed Locations 
 
In order to obtain a baseline measurement, we 
decided to conduct a “stationary” tracking test, where 
the tracking device was kept stationary in an open 
area for about one hour periods at different times of 
the day on three consecutive days. Two different 
locations were used, but they are relatively nearby 
each other and exhibit similar sky visibility 
characteristics. From the resulting data logs, we 
calculated the mean longitude and latitude measured 
by the device and the standard deviation for these 
measurements. The standard deviation was then 
converted to an approximate distance in meters using 
the following equations: 
 
 
 
where  is the distance in the north-south direction 
in meters,  is the standard deviation in latitude in 
degrees,  is the number of meters in one 
degree latitude at 60º latitude,  is the distance in 
the east-west direction in meters,  is the 
standard deviation in longitude in degrees, and 
 is the number of meters in one degree 
longitude at 60º latitude. Since all of our 
measurements occur at approximately 60º latitude, 
this approximation should be sufficient for this level 
of analysis. 
We also record for each test case the average 
number of satellites detected and the average 
Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP), which is a 
measure of expected precision based on the 
configuration of the GPS satellites used in the 
position calculation. We repeated these measurements 
using both the PhotoNav GPS receiver and the N95 
mobile device. The results are presented below in 
tables 1 and 2 below, respectively. 
 
 
GPS Receiver 
Day Time of 
Day 
Duration # of 
Fixes 
Mean  
# of 
Sats. 
Mean 
HDOP 
Mean Long. 
(degrees) 
σ Long. 
(m) 
Mean 
Lat. 
(degrees) 
σ 
Lat. 
(m) 
Day 1 Morning 1:06:26 3987 10.8 0.829 60.22526 1.829 24.75572 1.350 
Day 1 Evening 1:04:49 3890 7.0 1.546 60.15515 4.450 24.74468 4.697 
Day 2 Morning 0:40:49 2450 10.1 0.928 60.22518 0.535 24.75581 1.571 
Day 2 Evening 1:00:36 3637 7.4 1.401 60.15525 0.265 24.74478 0.637 
Day 3 Morning 1:30:02 5403 10.4 0.874 60.15523 0.156 24.74489 0.809 
  Total 19367   Average 1.4313 Average 1.7654 
Table 1:Measurements with GPS Receiver 
 
Mobile 
 
Day Time of 
Day 
Duration # of 
Fixes 
Mean  
# of 
Sats. 
Mean 
HDOP 
Mean 
Long. 
(degrees) 
σ 
Long. 
(m) 
Mean 
Lat. 
(degrees) 
σ 
Lat. 
(m) 
Day 1 Afternoon 0:49:57 497 6.0 1.767 60.15524 1.768 24.74471 0.763 
Day 1 Evening 0:56:27 563 6.4 1.849 60.15524 2.016 24.74473 1.117 
Day 2 Morning 0:40:05 399 6.9 1.537 60.22528 4.586 24.75570 1.891 
Day 3 Morning 1:28:55 884 7.1 1.285 60.15524 1.022 24.74470 0.709 
  Total 2970   Average 2,0260 
 
Average 1,0198 
 
Table 2: Measurements with Mobile phone 
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Table 3: Difference between High sensitivity and Low sensitivity modes 
 
By comparing these tables, we can see that the GPS 
receiver generally gives a higher level of precision 
due to its ability to detect a higher number of 
satellites (on average). There is, however, a 
significant variability in the number of satellites 
detected for each test run, which in turn affects the  
 
HDOP and standard deviation of the position 
measurements. This is mostly due to the fact that the 
satellites are constantly moving in their orbits, so 
during different segments of the day, there are a 
different number of satellites in the field of view of 
the GPS receiver. This can also be seen in Figure 12 
below, which shows a histogram of the number of 
satellites detected for the GPS receiver and mobile 
device, respectively. 
 
 
Fig 12:Histogram of the number of satellites detected 
 
During our measurements, we noticed that the 
sensitivity of the mobile device is affected by the 
position of the slide-out keyboard. This is due to the 
fact that the GPS module is installed directly below 
the keyboard, so if the keboard is positioned in the 
“out” configuration, the sensitivity is much higher. 
We therefore call this configuration “high sensitivty 
mode,” whereas the closed position we call “low 
sensitivity mode. This difference can be clearly seen 
in Table 3, where we present two different 
measurements in high and low sensitivity mode, 
respectively. Similarly Figure 13 below shows the 
difference in HDOP value between high sensitivity 
and low sensitivity mode. 
 
 
Fig 13: Difference in HDOP value between high 
sensitivity and low sensitivity mode 
 
Figure 14 below shows these precision measurements 
distributed on a geographic plot. We can see the 
position measurements from the mobile device are 
distributed over a wide area, but mainly concentrated 
in a 4 m radius circle. When the mobile device was in 
“low sensitivity mode”, the positions are much less 
concentrated around one area (i.e. higher standard 
deviation). For the GPS receiver, the position 
measurements are quite concentrated in one area, 
however, we noticed during these measurements was 
the position gradually and consistently moved from 
east to west. We surmise that there is perhaps some 
software error or averaging function in the device 
which causes this undesirable behavior. 
 
Day Time of 
Day 
Duration # of 
Fixes 
Mean  
# of 
Sats. 
Mean 
HDOP 
Mean 
Long. 
(degrees) 
σ 
Long. 
(m) 
Mean 
Lat. 
(degrees) 
σ 
Lat. 
(m) 
Day 3 
High Morning 
1:28:55 884 7.1 1.285 60.15524 1.022 24.74470 0.709 
Day 3 
Low Morning 
1:02:17 627 4.7 2.495 60.15521 8.122 24.74469 3.800 
  Total 2970   Average 3,9681 
 
Average 1,9916 
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Fig. 14: Stationary test, horizontal plot 
 
Figure 15 shows a plot of the vertical component 
of the position measurements for our stationary tests. 
Here you can clearly the difference in precision 
between the GPS receiver and the mobile device in 
both low sensitivity and high sensitivity mode. 
 
 
 
Fig. 15: Stationary test, vertical plot 
 
 
 
 
 
VI.III Data Loss Rate 
 
In order to measure the rate of GPS data loss, we 
conducted various mobile tracking measurements for 
different use cases, described in Section V above. 
Afterwards, we compared the mobile logs with the 
logs stored on our third-party server to determine how 
many measurements were successfully sent to the 
server. The results are shown below in Table 4. 
Data loss can occur due to a variety of factors. In 
our tests, buffering was activated in the mobile 
device, so if there was no mobile network, the 
position measurements could be sent once network 
coverage resumed. There is a limit, however, to the 
size of the buffer, and in the rural driving case, we 
reached this limit. Another source of data loss is the 
inability of the device to generate an “active” GPS 
fix, due to obstruction or other factors. The software 
is designed to record a time measurement in the 
mobile log, but not to send this measurement to the 
server. So this is a second source of data loss, due to 
the unavailability of the data itself. 
We can see from this table, however, that the rate 
of data loss is quite low for the use cases under 
investigation. It was highest for the suburban 
bicycling case, probably due to the fact that the 
device was obstructed by the user’s backpack, body, 
and/or clothing.  
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Day 
Total # 
of 
Fixes 
 # of 
Active 
Fixes 
Number 
Received 
by Both 
Number 
Recorded 
by Mobile 
Log 
Number 
recorded 
only by 
Server 
Percen
tage of 
Total 
Percent
age of 
Active 
Rural car driving 17719 17456 17438 279 2 98.4% 99.9% 
Suburban driving 2784 2661 2661 123 0 95.6% 100% 
Urban Driving 1175 1163 1162 13 0 98.8% 99.9% 
Suburban Bicycling 3064 2771 2770 274 0 90.4% 99.9% 
Sailing in Gulf 970 969 969 1 0 99.9% 100% 
Table 4: Comparison of the mobile logs with the logs stored on our third-party server 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
 
VII.I General observations 
GSM Tracker is easy to use and offers versatile 
options for the settings. In everyday use the GSM 
Tracker was very reliable and worked very smoothly. 
GPS Trace Orange is easy to use and offers basic 
service for satellite based tracking. The service could 
have better security because it supports only http 
protocol. GPS Trace Orange is very reliable GPS 
tracking service. 
Mobile network service and coverage in Finland 
is quite good. Operators are upgrading their networks 
constantly and the latest features are supported. 
 
 
VII.II Rural and long haul tracking by car 
Smart phone battery consumption is high when the 
GPS is activated. We didn’t make any measurements 
for the battery consumption but the battery had to be 
charged more often than without GPS. Usage of the 
continuous power feed is recommended if it is 
possible. In the summer the smart phone heats up in 
the sun shine if the smart phone is placed on the top 
of the console. 
Once mobile logging buffer filled up and tracking 
was stopped. The reason was that there were many 
previous logs on the flash drive of the mobile. Only 
once mobile Internet connection was lost and the 
tracking application was restarted manually. 
 
VII.III Urban tracking by car  
The results of the stationary tracking shows that 
the sensitivity of the smart phone with GPS is lower 
compared to the GPS receiver. For that reason we 
didn’t make any calculations for the urban trace logs 
but we uploaded the NMEA data to the Google Earth 
for the visual inspection. Plotted routes didn’t differ 
remarkably from the each other and the performance 
of the smart phone was quite satisfactory.  
 
 
VI.IV Sailing 
Map offered by the GPS Trace orange is not 
suitable for the tracking boats. The map of the 
tracking service does not offer detailed information 
about lake or sea areas. The tracking data needs to be 
downloaded from the service and could be combined 
with the navigational chart. 
 
VII.V Bicycling 
The smart phone is not suitable for the serious 
fitness usage. The smart phone does not stand 
moisture or hard mechanical stress. The durability of 
the battery could limit the usability in the long term 
exercise. The mobile could be covered with the shield 
for extra protection. 
 
VII.VI Incoming circuit switched call 
While using the smart phone as a tracking device 
we have to remember that it is still a mobile phone 
too. Incoming circuit switched call can cause 
interruption for the active GPRS session and the 
GPRS connection is suspended during circuit 
switched call. This feature can cause interruption for 
the real time location tracking. If the tracking device 
supports buffering the tracking data is delivered to the 
tracking service when GPRS connection is released 
from the suspension. 3G supports simultaneous 
packet data and circuit switched connections. 
We faced this situation a few times without data 
loss because our tracking device supports buffering. 
 
VII.VII DOS attack 
When a smart phone has an active packet data 
connection it has an IP-address. The host with the IP-
address is vulnerable for the security attacks if the 
network and the host are not protected properly. 
We noticed that it is possible to interfere a single 
smart phone user by sending data to the user without 
user request. We sent dummy UDP-data to the mobile 
host from the fixed line by using iperf application. 
The network was not protected properly and our data 
load was routed to the mobile. The capacity was 
reserved from the radio interface and the internet 
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connection of the mobile became unusable. In 
practise it is possible to scan mobile network with one 
mobile host and make DOS attack against all active 
users. 
DOS attack could cause interruption for the real 
time tracking or the battery of the mobile phone will 
drain very fast. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Satellite based tracking systems are widely used 
in real life but there is very rarely described how the 
system can be tested.  The system is complicated and 
building of field testing environment requires a lot of 
knowledge and expertise. The Laurea University of 
Applied Sciences has built up competence in the area 
with Saterisk project and it made this research 
possible. 
We found that basic functionality is very reliable 
and the system level performance is quite good. 
Especially modern telecommunication network can 
offer reliable data transfer path for the satellite based 
tracking application. We found that data transfer 
reliability is 99.9 percent when tracking device 
supports buffering in case that there are connectivity 
problems. However, the test set was executed only in 
Finland and more testing is needed in international 
environment. 
Modern smart phone includes integrated GPS and 
navigation functionality. Our tests revealed that the 
smart phone with much functionality is a 
compromise. The GPS sensitivity is worse to 
compared real GPS receiver. The smart phone was 
able to detect 2 to 10 satellites when the GPS receiver 
detected 7 to 13 satellites in the same environment. 
The measured mean stationary longitude deviation 
was 2,03m and mean stationary latitude deviation was 
1,02m. This observation doesn’t directly reflect to 
accuracy as expected and more testing is needed. 
We also noticed that the mechanical design of the 
smart phone can have affect to the GPS performance. 
The used smart phone (Nokia N95) has slide-out 
keyboard and the GPS sensitivity is remarkable 
higher when the keyboard is exposed. The reason is 
that the GPS chip is located under the keyboard.  
A smart phone can offer satisfactory consumer 
level user experience with satellite based tracking 
service but in professional use it is more reasonable to 
consider other options. Dedicated tracking devices 
can offer more mechanical durability and they are not 
vulnerable for security risks like smart phones. 
Laurea University of Applied Sciences will 
continue field testing with satellite based tracking 
systems. The next phase is to create database for 
tracking data and automate tracking data analysis. 
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